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Abstract
The recent advancements in computing and sensor technologies, coupled with improve-
ments in embedded system design methodologies, have resulted in the novel paradigm called
the Internet of Things (IoT). IoT is essentially a network of small embedded devices enabled
with sensing capabilities that can interact with multiple entities to relay information about
their environments. This sensing information can also be stored in the cloud for further
analysis, thereby reducing storage requirements on the devices themselves. The above fac-
tors, coupled with the ever increasing needs of modern society to stay connected at all times,
has resulted in IoT technology penetrating all facets of modern life. In fact IoT systems are
already seeing widespread applications across multiple industries such as transport, utility,
manufacturing, healthcare, home automation, etc.
Although the above developments promise tremendous benefits in terms of productivity
and efficiency, they also bring forth a plethora of security challenges. Namely, the current
design philosophy of IoT devices, which focuses more on rapid prototyping and usability,
results in security often being an afterthought. Furthermore, one needs to remember that
unlike traditional computing systems, these devices operate under the assumption of tight
resource constraints. As such this makes IoT devices a lucrative target for exploitation
by adversaries. This inherent flaw of IoT setups has manifested itself in the form of various
distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks that have achieved massive throughputs without
the need for techniques such as amplification, etc. Furthermore, once exploited, an IoT
device can also function as a pivot point for adversaries to move laterally across the network
and exploit other, potentially more valuable, systems and services. Finally, vulnerable IoT
vi
devices operating in industrial control systems and other critical infrastructure setups can
cause sizable loss of property and in some cases even lives, a very sobering fact.
In light of the above, this dissertation research presents several novel strategies for iden-
tifying known and zero-day attacks against IoT devices, as well as identifying infected IoT
devices present inside a network along with some mitigation strategies. To this end, network
telescopes are leveraged to generate Internet-scale notions of maliciousness in conjunction
with signatures that can be used to identify such devices in a network. This strategy is fur-
ther extended by developing a taxonomy-based methodology which is capable of categorizing
unsolicited IoT behavior by leveraging machine learning (ML) techniques, such as ensemble
learners, to identify similar threats in near-real time. Furthermore, to overcome the chal-
lenge of insufficient (malicious) training data within the IoT realm, a generative adversarial
network (GAN) based framework is also developed to identify known and unseen attacks
on IoT devices. Finally, a software defined networking (SDN) based solution is proposed to
mitigate threats from unsolicited IoT devices.
vii
1 Introduction
This dissertation presents a study of security frameworks and methodologies for the
Internet of Things (IoT). The focus is on leveraging recent advances in the area of machine
learning (ML) and deep learning (DL), along with novel networking paradigms, to boost
IoT security. Hence this introductory chapter presents an overview of security threats to
IoT devices and networks, as well as the key motivations for this work. Subsequently, an
overview of the core contributions of this research are presented along with a broad outline
of the remaining chapters.
1.1 Background Overview
The last few years have seen an exponential rise in the popularity of tiny embedded devices
collectively known as IoT. These devices have steadily forayed into all aspects of modern
society and are changing the way people, businesses and industries operate. One of the
primary motivations for development in this domain has been the need to have smart devices
and applications that can operate autonomously without the need for human intervention
(for control and data analysis). IoT growth has been further fueled by advances and cost
efficiencies in embedded systems design, optimized application development and improved
communication protocols.
The manifold benefits of IoT technology are already being seen across multiple diverse
sectors. For example, pervasive medical devices are being used to continuously monitor pa-
tient health and independently and immediately communicate any abnormalities to health
monitoring centers. The benefits of IoT devices are also visible in the manufacturing sector,
leading to overall improvement in production capacity as well as logistics. In addition to
1
this, the visions for smart homes, intelligent transportation and smart cities are now being
realized with the help of IoT devices as well, leading to improved standards of living and
convenience in daily life. For example, massive amounts of sensor data gathered by IoT
devices can be used by the transport industry to improve efficiency and reduce operational
costs. Legacy power distribution infrastructures are also being enhanced with the use of
IoT devices, leading to efficient resource utilization and energy distribution. IoT devices are
also seeing applications in waste management and environmental monitoring. New commu-
nication technologies, such as radio frequency identification (RFID), are also enabling novel
concepts such as smart parking and optimized traffic routing. New paradigms like vehicle-
to-vehicle communication are also being envisioned, leveraging various sensors connected in
an intelligent network to improve road travel safety. Furthermore, IoT devices will also be
key enablers in future self-driving cars.
Clearly, the large scale deployment of IoT devices promises to transform many aspects of
contemporary life. However, as is the case with any disruptive technology, IoT too brings with
it a pandora’s box of challenges [1]. One of the most prominent flaws of IoT has been the lack
of built-in security mechanisms akin to those seen in traditional systems, e.g., like servers,
personal computers and laptops. This shortcoming arises due to the fact that most embedded
devices do not have the computational resources required to implement advanced security
policies and encryption. Furthermore, due to increased market competition, manufacturers of
IoT devices typically have paid more attention to the “three Ps”, i.e., prototype, production
and packaging, without giving much importance to security. Software updates and patches
for IoT devices are also not automated and in many cases not even supported. In the
few instances that one can find certain security mechanisms, they are mostly ad hoc and
often do not extend beyond simple software implementations. Note that along with these
inherent security deficiencies, the sheer number and type of IoT devices made by different
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manufacturers inevitably facilitates exploitation by adversaries. This fact makes it very
difficult to come up with a singular security framework that adapts well to all scenarios.
Also, one of the key benefits of IoT is the massive amounts of data that its various sensors
generate, which in turn can be processed offline using big data analytics. However, these
steps often involve the use of third-party cloud hosting platforms, raising further issues of
user privacy and data integrity (both while the data is in transit and when it is stored on
remote servers). Thus, it becomes imperative to ensure that proper security mechanisms
are implemented to help maintain the integrity of IoT data, as well as protect private user
information from falling into the hands of malicious actors. As a result, the traditional
security triad of confidentiality, integrity and authentication (CIA) is no longer sufficient
and needs to include other security attributes, e.g., such as access control and availability,
given the dynamic nature of IoT networks. Finally, since a significant portion of IoT device
communication occurs over the wireless medium, this has further potential to lead to attacks
such as relay, man-in-the-middle (MITM), etc.
Overall, the above-noted vulnerabilities of IoT devices have manifested themselves in the
form of various malware and DDoS attacks. The most prominent of these was the Mirai
botnet [2] and the attack on Dyn DNS severs using an army of infected IoT cameras to
cause large scale disruption of Internet services. Similarly, other such attacks have also been
carried out using infected IoT devices to cause Internet-scale disruptions, see [3] [4].
1.2 Motivations
One critical challenge in developing security frameworks for IoT devices is the lack of
empirical data that can aid in the analysis of attacker behavior. This deficiency can be
attributed to multiple reasons, primary among them being logistics and privacy concerns.
The situation is further exacerbated by the variety of existing IoT devices in terms of their
types, versions, operating system, etc. Hence, inferring and characterizing unsolicited IoT
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behavior will directly benefit researchers in understanding critical weaknesses in related
protocols and system design. Ultimately these steps can lead to faster remediation strategies.
Nevertheless, attackers are also adapting to post-Mirai defense mechanisms installed by
various organizations. In essence, Mirai was basically a primitive malware that brute-forced
factory default username and passwords to gain access to insecure IoT devices. Hence this
modus operandi could be identified by looking for traffic directed towards or transmitted
by the telnet port, i.e., since telnet was the service used by Mirai to exploit IoT devices.
However, newer IoT malware variants are now evolving to remote code and other exploits
directed towards a specific device. These attacks are much harder to detect and can go
unnoticed by the aforementioned defense mechanism. This problem was clearly displayed in
the case of Reaper, Owari [5] and other Mirai variants which employed a much more complex
and discreet attack strategy.
Now the current body of research work on IoT security has primarily focused on context-
aware or behavioral models. The objective of these studies is to create and enforce col-
laborative models keeping in mind the heterogeneous nature and complex interactions of
IoT devices. Other endeavors have analyzed protocol weaknesses in specific IoT devices,
as well identifying access control and monitoring mechanisms in some of them. Meanwhile
researchers working in the area of wireless sensor networks (WSN) have focused their efforts
on MITM, denial of service (DoS), replay and similar attacks on the networking layer. Ef-
forts have also been made to leverage ML techniques and develop anomaly detection and
signature-based algorithms to identify unsolicited IoT behaviors.
However, as noted later, many of these solutions suffer from the lack of sufficient data
points to help build effective models to cover the entire spectrum of possible attacks. Yet
in other cases, proposed defense mechanisms are only effective for a certain type of device,
reducing their effectiveness in real world scenarios where many different types of devices
and communication protocols are used, i.e., a higher level of heterogeneity. It is also impor-
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tant to remember that attacker strategies are constantly evolving to defeat current security
mechanisms (as was pointed out earlier). This fact implies that simple signature-based al-
gorithms will prove inefficient in securing IoT setups. Thus the need of present and future
IoT systems is a dynamic and flexible security framework that can identify both simple and
complex threats to the network. In addition to this, such a framework should be able to
actively identify malicious IoT devices present within a network.
1.3 Problem Statement
This dissertation addresses the above challenges and develops a novel set of methodolo-
gies to secure IoT networks deployed in residential and enterprise environments. To this
end, network telescopes, i.e., darknet data, is leveraged to infer and characterize Internet
scale notions of maliciousness. A taxonomy of darknet data is then generated to categorize
unsolicited IoT data. This labelled data is then used in a security framework that employs
ML-based ensemble learners to identify malicious IoT traffic directed towards a network,
infected IoT devices within a network, as well as DoS activities conducted by IoT devices.
Finally, a generative adversarial network (GAN) based framework is also proposed to
identify zero-day attacks along with known exploits against IoT devices. The unique ad-
vantage of this model is that it does not rely on any malicious data for training purposes
and thus overcomes one of the key hindrances of securing IoT networks. This methodology
(when used in conjunction with the previous ensemble learning methodology) can potentially
identify a wide spectrum of threats. Innovative concepts such as software defined networking
(SDN) and network function virtualization (NFV) are also incorporated to build dynamic
security strategies that can be used with the aforementioned models to quickly mitigate a
threat once it has been identified.
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1.4 Proposed Work and Contributions
This dissertation studies the problem of securing IoT devices found in residential and
business enterprise networks. The key contributions of this effort include the following:
• A unique approach that leverages network telescopes (darknet data) to infer and char-
acterize malicious IoT devices seen on the Internet by correlating active and passive
empirical measurements (along with generating IoT-specific signatures using a rolling
hash algorithm).
• Characterization and labelling of different unsolicited IoT behaviors as well as train-
ing and testing of ensemble learners to classify IoT devices based on network traffic
characteristics.
• Design of a novel framework using a GAN-based neural network to identify known and
zero-day attacks on IoT devices based on network flow characteristics.
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. First, Chapter 2 presents a
detailed survey of the IoT ecosystem along with some of the security models proposed to
defend IoT networks. Next, Chapter 3 details an empirical approach that leverages data
from the CAIDA darknet repository for characterizing unsolicited IoT devices seen on the
Internet. A rolling hash algorithm is also proposed for generating signatures that can be used
alongside intrusion detection systems (IDS) to help organizations identify attacks against
their IoT infrastructures.
Chapter 4 then extends this work by developing a taxonomy-based methodology for cat-
egorizing malicious IoT activities. This framework is then used to train a set of ensemble
learners to capture the unique characteristics of each type of malicious activity. This setup
can also be used as a stand-alone system for detecting malicious IoT activities. Meanwhile
Chapter 5 presents a GAN-based neural network for identifying various seen and unseen
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attacks on actual IoT devices. An advanced implementation framework for quickly mitigat-
ing these threats is also proposed. Finally, conclusions and directions for future work are
thereafter presented in Chapter 6 to conclude this dissertation.
7
2 Background and Related Work
The overall area of IoT security has received a lot of attention in the last few years,
especially in the light of recent large scale DDoS attacks and crypto-mining bots. In response,
researchers have proposed various methodologies and frameworks to strengthen defenses for
IoT devices. Along these lines, this chapter overviews some of the latest developments in
the IoT domain and details key security mechanisms, with a particular focus on empirical
analysis and ML-based methods. Several SDN and NFV-based solutions are also surveyed.
2.1 Survey on the Internet of Things
The legacy Internet has rapidly evolved in the past few decades from a simple platform for
static web page transfers to a dynamic network consisting of multiple entities interacting and
exchanging information. Sensor networks and near field wireless communication technologies
have also seen a significant surge recently. Hence, the overall goal of IoT is to essentially
combine the advantages of these two technology domains and create an efficient system
where machines can operate autonomously in a self-organizing fashion. Indeed, the global
ubiquitous computing model along with the context-aware nature of IoT devices is bound
to provide many benefits for both individuals and organizations [6].
However the current standards and protocols developed for the Internet are not sufficient
for the IoT sector owing to its heterogeneous nature and the low resource constraints of its
tiny embedded devices. Thus, the research community and various standardization bodies
have concentrated their efforts on developing solutions that are better-suited for the IoT
ecosystem.
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In particular, the following is a brief summary of some of the encapsulation, routing
and session layer protocols that have been developed (or improved upon) to suit better the
diverse nature of IoT:
• 6LowPAN: Protocol to enable IPv6 packets to work effectively in low-powered and
lossy environments (IEEE 802.15.4)
• IEEE 802.15.4-206: Layer 1 or physical layer specifications for lossy networks
• Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP): Representation State Transfer (REST)
based protocol for web-based communication with low-powered IoT devices
• Zigbee: Communication protocol built on the IEEE 802.15.4-2003 standard to enable
the creation of low-rate ad-hoc wireless networks
• MQTT: A publish/subscribe architecture for asynchronous transfer of telemetry mes-
sages for low power and resource-constrained networks
• RPL: Distance vector routing protocol for lossy IoT networks
• IPv6 over Bluetooth: Low energy bluetooth-based solution using 6LowPAN compres-
sion techniques
• BACnet: Communication protocols for use in supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA) and industrial control systems (ICS) systems
As seen above, the efforts in this domain have primarily focused on improving commu-
nication methodologies in light of the resource requirements of an IoT network. However,
middleware is another important aspect of IoT communications. Namely, middleware, as de-
fined in [7], is a layer of abstraction between the devices and the applications that use them.
The primary motivation for using middleware has been the fact that creating customized
applications for each device is a challenging task owing to the sheer number and variety of
9
IoT devices. Hence, middleware enables much easier integration with legacy technologies
as well as rapid development of new ones. Along these lines, [7] discusses the individual
components that collectively form the IoT middleware, a brief summary of which is provided
below:
• Service Composition: Top layer that enables composition of individual services for
creating specific applications
• Service Management: Focuses on the management of services and devices in the IoT
ecosystem
• Object Abstraction: Enables standard web-based communication in an IoT environ-
ment by wrapping individual objects under a common framework to simplify accessi-
bility
Akin to [7], a number of other studies have explored various trends and developments in
the IoT domain. For example, [8] provides a comprehensive survey of IoT technologies in
which the authors discuss various advances in hardware and application development. This
work also points out the various challenges encountered when integrating IoT devices with
conventional systems. However, this survey fails to provide any in-depth analysis of security
concerns for IoT devices (although the authors do touch upon issues of data privacy and
authentication). Meanwhile, [9] analyzes some important wireless communication protocols
and also discusses some applications for IoT, e.g., smart parking, augmented maps, logistics,
etc.
Overall, the general trend in IoT research has been to focus on issues related to the inter-
operability between various devices, protocols, and the applications built on top of them.
By contrast, security in this domain has only now started to gain traction in the past few
years, i.e., owing to the increasing severity of DDoS attacks as well as privacy concerns raised
by the vulnerability of these pervasive devices. However, the number of IoT devices is only
10
expected to increase with the move to a more digital and automated future. Furthermore,
the integration of legacy systems with IoT devices will also give rise to hitherto unforeseen
security vulnerabilities.
Hence, in light of the above, conventional security standards and policies need to be
reinvented. Furthermore, new developments in data analytics and networking also need to
be adopted to provide more pro-active identification of IoT threats and rapid remediation
strategies.
2.2 Survey on IoT Security Threats
Although the market for IoT devices has been expanding rapidly, in the rush to realize the
vision of connected things, security concerns have largely been neglected. This is similar to
the initial days of the Internet, where the main efforts were focused on improving connectivity
and scalability. However, as noted earlier, the traditional security triad of confidentiality,
integrity and availability (which was sufficient for the Internet) fails to meet new challenges in
the IoT sector. Particularly, issues of privacy and authentication, along with access control,
also need to be taken into account due to the rising popularity of service models such as
Infrastructure-as-a Service (IAAS) and Software-as-a-Service (SAAS) for provisioning IoT
devices. Specifically, in these frameworks personal user data is stored and managed by a
separate entity. Furthermore, most traditional security policies and methodologies need to
be re-evaluated to factor in the new and emerging IoT protocols and standards discussed in
Section 2.1, as well as the constrained computational resources of IoT devices. Now the IoT
itself is traditionally divided into 3 different layers, i.e., termed as perception, network and
application [10]. As such, each layer has its own set of technological and security challenges,
which are now further discussed.
The perception layer is primarily composed of sensing elements which monitor values such
as the temperature, motion, humidity, etc. This acquired data can then be processed (if the
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sensing element has adequate computational capability) and appropriately forwarded to the
network layer. Meanwhile, the network layer focuses on routing collected data (from the
perception layer) to various other devices, and in some cases, cloud service providers on the
Internet. Finally, the application layer is concerned with the applications and services built
on top of IoT devices and serves as the primary interface between the user and the device.
Bearing the above setup in mind, some recent literature analyzing IoT security principles,
technologies and possible countermeasures is now reviewed.
The authors in [11] provide an in depth analysis of the security requirements in an
IoT environment. Most importantly, they discuss the need to consider other challenges
to IoT security in the form of authentication, heterogeneity, policy and key management
systems, etc. Furthermore, they also analyze inherent security issues associated with each
layer in the IoT framework, namely perception, network and application. The authors then
provide a high-level overview of some potential countermeasures to the various security
concerns identified in recent literature. However these discussions focus on a few light-
weight authentication and access control measures, as well as key management issues for trust
establishment. The authors also emphasize the need for universal standards and policies, as
well as strict enforcement to ensure optimum performance and security in a heterogenous
IoT network.
Similarly, [12] discusses and analyzes the various layers, sub-layers and related function-
alities in the IoT architecture. The authors also highlight some potential attacks on each
of these layers. For example, perception layer threats can include attacks on availability,
authentication and service integrity as seen in WSNs. RFID security issues, such as tag
disabling, cloning and tracking, are also mentioned. Similarly, attacks on the network and
application layer (such as jamming, flooding, MITM and DoS) are also discussed. However,
further measures to secure IoT devices from the aforementioned threats are not covered in
this paper.
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Meanwhile, [13] provides a unique analysis of security in the IoT domain. Namely, this
paper proposes to use the unique features of IoT devices to identify potential security and
privacy concerns in the network. The argument here is that since IoT devices and the
environments in which they operate are significantly different from traditional computer
networks, any security analysis needs to incorporate these features. For example, the features
being analyzed here include interdependence, diversity, intimacy, ubiquitousness, mobility,
unattended access, constrained environments, and heterogeneity. The authors then provide a
detailed description of each of these features, along with a discussion of the associated threats
and security challenges for each. In addition, they also review recent research literature
that addresses some of the issues highlighted above and point to promising areas for future
research.
Other recent studies have also analyzed security issues for specific IoT applications. For
example, [14] and [15] consider security requirements in IoT-enabled smart grids. Namely,
[14] provides a comprehensive discussion of several security issues seen in smart grids such
as spoofing, eavesdropping, DoS and privacy issues. Similarly, [15] presents a survey of ex-
isting methodologies being proposed to improve security and privacy in such infrastructures.
Additionally, the authors also try to identify some challenges across different domains in
the smart grid architecture, primarily focusing on privacy issues and network layer attacks.
Meanwhile, [16] presents a case study of two IoT devices that are commonly used in con-
sumer and industrial IoT systems, i.e., a smart care hub for home automation and a smart
meter for smart grids. For each device, the authors examine the underlying hardware being
used and thereafter proceed to identify a few attack vectors. They also discuss the safety,
security and privacy implications of compromising such devices.
Overall, the above studies reaffirm the need to study IoT security from a fresh perspective,
i.e., to take into account the unique security challenges encountered in such settings. A few
potential solutions here include frequent and secure update mechanisms, anonymizing user
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identification data, as well as secure hardware and design principles. In addition, a pro-
active strategy to identify various IoT threats also needs to be developed. These studies
also highlight the need to carefully address privacy considerations for users in light of the
ubiquitous and pervasive nature of IoT devices.
2.3 Survey on Machine/ Deep Learning Applications in IoT
Machine learning (ML) is a subset of artificial intelligence (AI) that learns a predictive
model without being explicitly programmed to do so. Specifically, the goal of ML-based
algorithms is to optimize a certain objective function, often called the error or loss function, in
an iterative manner using a set of training samples. Such models also consist of various hyper-
parameters that can be fine-tuned to improve prediction accuracy. Now in the past, ML
applications were somewhat limited due to the high computation and storage requirements
of the data needed to train and test related models. However, today this field is seeing
much renewed interest from applications in various industries such as finance, health care,
web search engines, etc. Again, this renewed focus can be attributed to improvements in
enabling hardware and software technologies (that are also responsible for the growth of the
IoT technology sector and market).
Furthermore, deep learning (DL) is a form of ML that mimics the functioning of the
human brain. Specifically, this approach uses multiple hidden layers of neurons and can excel
at learning from complex high-dimensional data sets to produce highly accurate prediction
models. The uses of ML have been further broadened by advances in graphical processor unit
(GPU) technologies. Namely, GPUs have evolved from supporting mostly video games into
more generalized computing-type roles. These devices differ from CPUs in that they support
a large number of simple cores and a significantly large number of concurrent hardware
threads, thereby enabling much more efficient and faster computations. As such, these
devices are very amenable to DL models (neural networks with a large number of nodes)
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that need to perform large amounts of calculations during the learning phase. Finally,
the massive amounts of generated data these days (also known as big data) has enabled
researchers to overcome the issue of overfitting, which is a common limitation arising due to
smaller sample sizes.
Overall, ML algorithms can be broadly classified into two key categories, namely unsu-
pervised and supervised learning. A brief description of the two is provided below:
• Unsupervised learning: The main objective of these techniques is to identify natural
patterns or structures in unlabelled data, e.g., or in other words, the expected outcome
value is unknown. Unsupervised learning can also be used for dimensionality reduction,
which is especially useful when the number of features for a given data set may be too
large.
• Supervised learning: The main objective of these techniques is to identify relationships
or patterns that help predict the correct labels for a given data set. Hence these
learning models are supplemented with labels to help transfer some domain knowledge
to the data sets. These algorithms are mainly used for classification and regression
problems.
In general, a review of the core literature in ML and DL reveals that most studies have
focused on improving performance for applications such as image classification, linguistics
and audio tasks. However, recent efforts have also started to explore the applications of
such techniques in other domains as well, including cybersecurity. For example, [17] presents
a detailed survey on the applications of data mining and ML methods in cybersecurity.
Namely, the paper reviews the various steps involved here, which include data pre-processing,
feature extraction, class labelling as well as training and testing. The paper also discusses
some of the typical metrics used to ascertain the predicting capabilities of the model, e.g.,
such as accuracy, sensitivity, false accuracy rate (FAR), etc. The authors also review some
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of the common data types and data sets being used by researchers in the cybersecurity
domain and provide a detailed analysis of the more popular ML and DL algorithms. Finally,
important observations and challenges in applying such techniques to cybersecurity problems
are discussed and recommendations are made for selecting the most appropriate algorithms
for a specific task.
Meanwhile, in [18] the authors analyze ML applications for WSNs and present a brief
overview of three main types of models, i.e., supervised, unsupervised and reinforcement
learning. Related ML literature that addresses some of the functional challenges seen in
WSNs is also reviewed, e.g., such as activity recognition, query optimization, medium access
control (MAC) protocol design, broadcast scheduling, etc. The paper also highlights the
challenges in applying ML algorithms to the IoT domain and identifies areas for future
research. In [19] the authors present a statistical model that tries to characterize IoT devices
based upon their network traffic. Essentially, this paper proposes a behavioral model using
network traffic generated by IoT devices that are typically seen in smart cities and campuses.
In particular the authors collect network data from 28 unique IoT devices and generate a
statistical model that clusters data using the K-means algorithm for identification.
Meanwhile, [20] proposes a cloud-based offloading mechanism for malware detection.
This work demonstrates the tradeoff between transmission cost and detection performance
as seen in the radio channels of mobile devices. Additionally, the authors also propose
three reinforcement learning techniques using Q-learning algorithms and related variants to
improve detection accuracy and bandwidth utilization (by offloading application traces to
cloud-based servers). Similarly, in [21] the authors analyze various security issues in WSNs
such as DoS, spoofing, eavesdropping, etc. Furthermore, they also propose a multi-layered
computational intelligence based architecture to be used as a wireless intrusion detection
system (IDS). The advantages of this design are also outlined, e.g., such as robustness,
adaptability, faster detection times, etc. Finally, in [22] the authors identify physical layer
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spoofing attacks as a zero sum game of authentication between the adversary and WSN
nodes. The Nash-Equilibrium (NE) of this game is then derived and akin to [20], Q-learning
techniques are used to identify attacks based upon the uniqueness of the channel state of
the transmitter. Overall, the above works attempt to address security concerns for WSNs
and also present some unique solutions for certain functional challenges as well. However,
security vulnerabilities of other communication technologies and protocols that are typically
seen in IoT environments are not addressed here.
Meanwhile, in [23] the authors propose a classification algorithm that can distinguish
between IoT and non-IoT devices using ML and network traffic characteristics. Namely
three popular ensemble learners are used here (i.e., gradient boosting, random forest and
XGBoost) in a multistage process. The authors also test their algorithms on 9 commercial
IoT devices. Overall, this solution demonstrates high accuracy in identifying IoT devices
from non-IoT data in a supervised learning environment. However, the lack of sufficient
non-IoT data and the reliance on just the hyper-text transfer protocol (HTTP) protocol
can potentially lead to overfitting. Along these lines, the authors acknowledge the need
to include other protocols and test system scalability in future research. Furthermore, [24]
presents another example of an application of Q-learning for WSN security. Namely, this
model proposes a Markov-based framework that models a 2 player game between the sensor
and the attacker, and results show high accuracy in identifying signal-to-interference-plus
noise ratio (SINR) based DoS attacks on WSN nodes.
2.4 Applications in Intrusion Detection System
Network traffic characteristics are extensively used by various intrusion detection and
prevention systems (IDS/IPS) to identify threats to general computing systems. Specifically,
these detection systems are generally divided into the following two major categories.
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• Signature Matching: This mechanism identifies the key features of a malware and
generates a signature based upon these features to identify its future presence.
• Anomaly Detection: This mechanism generates a “normal” profile for the devices in a
network and flags any deviations from this behavior as an anomaly.
As expected, a signature-based IDS needs to constantly adapt to an evolving threat
landscape. However, such a methodology can potentially fail against zero-day or never-
before-seen attacks. On the other hand, anomaly-based mechanisms identify deviations in
the “normal behavior” of a device and hence are better at identifying previously-unseen
attacks. However, such methods tend to produce a higher number of false positives, i.e.,
they can be very sensitive to changes in behavior profiles.
Accordingly, the authors in [25] use ML algorithms to classify malware on the Internet
by observing network data packet payloads. Specifically, they use the Random Forest, Naive
Bayes’ and J48 learning algorithms to identify malware activities using multiple network pro-
tocols and different resolution of network activities. However, these schemes can suffer from
high operational overheads and fail to identify new threats (whose characteristics deviate
from the family of malware used for training). Additionally this research does not include
any provisions for IoT devices. Meanwhile, [26] presents a selection methodology using the
chi-square method to identify the best features in a given feature set for a payload-based
IDS. These selected features are then used in a multi-class support vector machine (SVM)
classifier, and the results show improved performance as compared to other payload-based
classifiers (on the NSL-KDD and KDDCup 1999 datasets).
Additionally, [27] proposes the use of recurrent neural networks (RNN) to identify anoma-
lies in network activity. Namely, the authors liken network communication between two
computers to human speech, wherein grammar rules are represented by the underlying pro-
tocols and services being supported. This interaction is then modeled using a long short-term
memory (LSTM) RNN that uses flow sequences derived for every pair of IP addresses com-
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municating in the network. The model is then trained using benign traffic, and flows are
generated based upon sequences of port and protocol numbers. Note that two different
datasets are used here, one which contains no attack traffic and another which includes some
attack traffic. The overall results show that ML or DL models can provide an efficient tool
to detect anomalous device behavior. In [28] the authors also explore the use of artificial
immune systems to mitigate DoS attacks. Namely, the proposed solution is modeled after
the behavior of human biological defense mechanisms, and a distributed sensor network is
used to monitor the environment and coordinate and improve defense capabilities against
DoS attacks.
Furthermore, [29] presents a study on the behavioral analysis of darknet data to iden-
tify malware activities of infected hosts. A data mining approach is then used for early
identification of DDoS attacks by extracting features based upon network traffic character-
istics. This work shows how darknet data, when combined with data mining techniques,
can help identify Internet-scale malicious activities. Also, in [30] the authors use association
rule extraction to detect anomalies and identify recurrent packets in the data with features
similar to NetFlow. However, this solution does not provide automatic traffic classification
and requires human expertise to analyze data and draw useful conclusions. Furthermore, no
IoT-specific concerns are addressed in this work either.
In [31] the authors propose an IDS called SVELTE (literally meaning elegantly slim) for
IoT networks. However, this system is only applicable to 6LoWPAN IoT networks using the
IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPL). The authors also evaluate
their approach using the Contiki operating system. Meanwhile [32] presents an anomaly
detection framework for IoT devices. The algorithm essentially generates a normal profile for
devices by using bit pattern matching of payload data. Thereafter, any deviations are flagged
as anomalous. Similarly, the work in [21] tables a computational intelligence framework to
generate behavior profiles for devices in a wireless system environment. Meanwhile, the
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authors in [33] also use ML methods to detect suspicious IoT devices connected to a network
through the use of static whitelists within the enterprise (which define allowable devices).
However this scheme can easily be bypassed given (unauthorized) access to the whitelist.
Furthermore, the authors do not consider other malicious activities that may target IoT
devices from outside the enterprise domain.
An artificial neural network (ANN) based IDS for IoT devices is also presented in [34].
However, this work only focuses on the identification of a single type of attack i.e., DoS and
DDoS attack. Furthermore, this scheme is not very computationally-efficient and may not
be suitable for online learning. Similarly, [35] also uses ANNs to identify malicious IoT ac-
tivity. The experimental setup here consists of an IoT testbed emulating node devices and a
Raspberry Pi device which serves as a gateway for these nodes. However, this methodology
requires a sufficient number of data points to validate its efficacy. Although the authors
introduce invalid data points to define anomalous activity, they do not provide a solid ex-
planation of what constitutes an anomaly for devices used in their testbed. Overall, the lack
of sufficient data points has been known to cause overfitting in the case of ANNs with many
tunable parameters. Furthermore, [34] uses an ANN to detect unsolicited IoT behavior.
However, this approach uses simulated data which again is not necessarily a very accurate
representation of real world attack patterns. Clearly the lack of realistic empirical IoT data
can be a significant hindrance in testing the efficacy of any proposed intrusion and anomaly
detection systems.
To address some of the above concerns, the authors in [36] propose a DL model that
is trained and tested on the NSL-KDD dataset. The algorithm is primarily meant for fog
networks, i.e., using a distributed attack detection architecture consisting of multiple fog
nodes running the DL algorithm. Namely, these nodes are managed by a centralized master
node to share model parameters and optimize performance. However, even though the model
exhibits good accuracy, the dataset used here is quite old and does not include any IoT-
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specific provisions. Furthermore, as shown in [37], this particular dataset is not necessarily
a good representation of real world network traffic.
Finally, [38] uses autoencoders to identify malware, such as Mirai and Bashlite, which
exploit port scanning and brute force authentication to infect IoT devices and launch large
scale DDoS attacks. Namely, this work uses auto-encoders, which are known to be good
inference machines, and trains them using network traffic statistics for detecting such attacks.
Specifically, an auto-encoder is trained for each device in the network and a normal profile
is also generated for these devices. Thus, when a device is infected, the previously trained
auto-encoder will flag it as an anomaly. However, this approach has the added operational
overhead of training an auto-encoder for every possible device in the network (and hence
may not scale in large networks).
Overall, the above studies show the efficiency of ML and DL models for detecting secu-
rity vulnerabilities in IoT devices. However it is also quite apparent that a lack of sufficient
malicious training data is a major shortcoming when developing these models and this can
potentially lead to over-fitting. As such, many of the proposed methodologies will be in-
effective against zero-day attacks. Furthermore, some of the proposed solutions also carry
additional processing and storage overheads making them unsuitable for real-time detection.
2.5 Survey on SDN/NFV Solutions for IoT Security
The large amount of data generated by millions of IoT devices and their varying com-
munication needs are bound to stress current networking infrastructures. Furthermore, the
move by many cloud providers to offer SAAS offerings for IoT users further complicates
matters. However, SDN and NFV are two novel networking paradigms that have been de-
veloped to address many of the scalability, management and security issues encountered in
traditional networks. As a result, these frameworks enable network administrators to im-
plement policies that can dynamically adapt to network requirements. Furthermore, SDN
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also separates the control and data planes, thereby providing a global view of the network
with routing/switching elements that can be programmatically configured using a centralized
controller. Meanwhile, NFV on the other hand virtualizes conventional networking functions
such as firewall, load balancers, etc. As such, NFV-enabled setups allow dynamic service
provisioning with greatly-reduced operational costs, i.e., as specialized hardware is no longer
required (and a single server can host multiple virtual functions).
In light of the above, researchers have also explored the potential applications of SDN
and NFV concepts in various networking environments and analyzed the security and per-
formance implications of these software-centric strategies. Accordingly, [39] enumerates the
various advantages of this framework, e.g., such as scalability, granularity, service chaining
and improved security capabilities. The authors also detail multiple approaches that leverage
these technologies along with ML classification methods for implementing a stateful firewall
in an enterprise network. Finally, they also discuss various challenges in implementing a
SDN/NFV-based firewall design with a particular focus on security issues at the control
plane and performance limitations of flow-based policy enforcement. Meanwhile, [40] pro-
poses a priority-based algorithm to handle DoS attacks launched against the SDN controller.
Akin to an anomaly detection scheme, this solution defines normal user behaviors and assigns
priorities to new flows by using a ranking algorithm that compares them to benign profiles
(generated earlier). Hence in the case of a DoS attack, the algorithm follows a differential
policy by assigning lower priorities to attack traffic and higher priorities to legitimate users.
Meanwhile, numerous other studies have also tried to leverage SDN and NFV solutions to
improve the performance and security of IoT networks. For example, [41] addresses potential
“new-flow” attacks in SDN-based IoT networks. Specifically, this attack is a particular type
of DoS attack that attempts to exhaust the resources in a switching element by sending many
packets that have no flow-rules associated with them. Hence a new flow attack can exhaust
the caching and bandwidth capacity of switching elements, ultimately leading to connectivity
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issues for legitimate IoT devices in the network. The paper also proposes a smart security
mechanism which proactively mitigates such attacks by redirecting anomalous traffic to a
security middleware.
Meanwhile, [42] proposes a Black SDN security architecture for IoT where the controller
serves as a trusted third party to manage network security and performance optimization.
Essentially, the framework encrypts the header and payload data of all packets, thereby
making it very difficult to infer any important information from user traffic in case of MITM
or inference attacks. Furthermore, any routing issues arising from encrypted headers are
handled by using a relatively simple broadcasting scheme. However, this work is primarily
focused only on the IEEE 802.15.4 protocol and imposes additional encryption overheads
which may affect performance in large scale networks.
The authors in [43] also leverage/apply emerging block chain technology within the SDN
framework to secure IoT devices. Namely, a DistBlockNet scheme is introduced, comprising
of multiple modules (such as OrchApp, Shelter, etc.) that dynamically adapt to network
changes and quickly identify and remediate attacks. The proposed architecture also uses a
distributed block chain network to securely update flow tables for all IoT forwarding devices.
Similarly, [44] proposes a distributed SDN architecture for IoT security. The concept is
similar to the grid of security network and utilizes a border (or security) controller that is
responsible for secure intra-SDN domain communication.
Finally, [45] uses a role-based security mechanism to improve security in IoT networks.
Namely, this framework implements different control functionalities (such as access con-
trol, key management, intrusion detection, etc.) on multiple controllers, thereby eliminat-
ing the problem of a single-point-of-failure and improving bandwidth utilization. However,
the authors admit that the proposed approach imposes consistency concerns and has high
communications overhead, which may affect its overall performance. Other works like [46]
and [47] have also explored SDN/NFV frameworks to improve network security and address
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scalability issues. Overall, these studies affirm the importance of a centralized management
philosophy with software implementations to improve efficiency and security in computer
and IoT networks.
2.6 Open Challenges
Overall, the above literature review clearly indicates the growing need to secure IoT
devices. Indeed, the heterogeneity and massive number of such devices makes it very difficult
to provide a one-fits-all solution. Furthermore, the lack of sufficient data (due to logistic and
privacy concerns) makes it even more challenging to infer large scale malicious activities of
IoT devices (and identify attacker trends and behavior). This lack of data also makes it very
hard to build effective ML and DL models, i.e., since these algorithms generally require a
sufficiently large amount of data to improve prediction accuracy and avoid generalization.
Furthermore many of the above works do not include popular and disruptive malware which
use brute force and other covert mechanisms to infect devices and launch large scale DDoS
attacks, e.g., such as Mirai, Reaper, etc. Therefore any security framework needs to take
into account not only the dynamic nature of IoT, but also evolving attacker behaviors which
are critical for identifying zero-day threats.
Finally as noted, SDN and NFV technology paradigms have also emerged as promising
security solutions and are rapidly challenging conventional networking practices. As a result,
several recent research studies have also tried to address various security challenges in IoT
devices by leveraging these concepts. However, further challenges relating to overhead and
latency are critical areas that need to be addressed in such cases in order to ensure efficient
and optimized IoT operation.
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3 Correlating Active and Passive Measurements to Infer and Characterize
Unsolicited IoT Devices1
The seamless interconnectivity of IoT devices with the physical world is delivering many
improvements across diverse application domains. However, compromised IoT devices pose
a significant and growing threat to user data integrity and privacy. Furthermore, as noted
in Chapter 2.2, when coupled with the highly-interconnected nature of IoT setups, even
a few poorly secured Internet-connected devices could potentially affect the security and
the resilience of the Internet at a global scale, not just locally. For example, an unprotected
camera or smart home hub infected by malware might send thousands of harmful spam emails
to worldwide recipients using the owner’s home Wi-Fi Internet connection [48]. Alternatively,
it may also try to infect other devices with the same malware. Additionally, exploited
Internet-scale IoT devices can be leveraged by an attacker to orchestrate malicious botnets,
causing immense damage to corporate and Internet services via DDoS attacks or other typical
misdemeanors [48]. In fact, examples of such Internet-scale attacks already exist as evidenced
by malware such as Mirai and its variants.
In light of the above, the imperative tasks of quantifying, characterizing and attributing
such vulnerable IoT devices will deliver a vital first step towards uncovering their inherent
vulnerabilities and understanding their malicious behavior [48]. Hence this chapter leverages
active measurements through (Internet-wide scanning) in conjunction with passive measure-
ments (in the context of darknet traffic analysis) to shed further light on compromised de-
1Parts of this chapter were published in F. Shaikh et al. Internet of Malicious Things: Correlating
Active and Passive Measurements For Inferring and Characterizing Internet-scale Unsolicited IoT Devices.
International Wireless Communication and Mobile Computing Conference, 2018. Permission included in
Appendix B
25
vices and analyze their unsolicited network traffic characteristics. Specifically the following
contributions are made here:
• An innovative approach to infer, characterize and attribute unsolicited Internet-scale
IoT devices by correlating passive and active empirical measurements.
• Generate IoT-specific malicious signatures by scrutinizing passive measurements. These
signatures, which are based upon fuzzy hashing techniques, can then be deployed in
local IoT realms for effective mitigation as well as for inferring other Internet-wide
unsolicited IoT devices.
• Analysis of close to half a million compromised IoT devices in smart home appliances,
critical infrastructures and automated control sector environments.
In a nutshell, as noted in [48], the proposed approach endeavors to generate actionable cy-
ber threat intelligence related to Internet-scale IoT devices by applying several data-driven
methodologies. These schemes mainly operate by scrutinizing passive empirical measure-
ments. Overall, the garnered insights and inferences can be distributed, in an operational
cyber-security fashion, to IoT stakeholders (i.e., operators, manufacturers, etc.) to assist
with prompt remediation and thus mitigation support. Therefore, an additional artifact of
the envisioned approach is also a repository which aims to index malicious IoT empirical
threat information to be shared with the research and operational communities at large.
Indeed such a facility can help provision advanced IoT threat analytics as well as support
further forensic investigations.
3.1 Notation Overview
Before presenting the details of the proposed scheme, the requisite notation is introduced
first. Namely, D is a list of IP addresses obtained from the CAIDA network telescope.
Meanwhile, A is defined as a list of IP addresses obtained from active measurements in the
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Shodan and Censys databases. Furthermore, H denotes the hash table which stores the
value of the hash function for IP addresses obtained from the Shodan and Censys databases.
Finally, h(x) is the hash function, and C is a list of all correlated IP addresses.
Table 1: List of variables
Variable Description
D List of passive measurement IP addresses
A List of active measurement IP addresses
ip IP address in D ∪ A
H Hash table
h(x) Hash function
C Correlated IP addresses
3.2 Inferring and Characterizing Internet-Scale Compromised IoT Devices
The heterogenous nature of IoT devices and their wide-scale deployment in different
environments (in addition to lack of visibility into local IoT realms) makes it very difficult
to generate substantial insights to characterize unsolicited IoT behaviors [48]. Therefore any
attempts to infer and characterize such IoT devices can be highly impactful and beneficial,
as they can effectively pinpoint infected devices to improve mitigation strategies. Overall,
the final objective here is to thwart malicious activity by adversaries and prevent them
from recruiting infected IoT devices as part of a bot network. In this context, a macroscopic
approach to infer Internet-wide malicious IoT devices is further realized by correlating passive
empirical passive measurements as well as active Internet measurements. This macroscopic
approach enables inferring large scale malicious IoT behaviors as well as evolving attacker
strategies.
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3.2.1 Exploiting Network Telescopes
Network telescopes, also known as darknets, constitute a set of routable and allocated,
but unused Internet Protocol (IP) addresses. Indeed darknet IP addresses provide a means
to passively measure Internet-scale maliciousness of devices, i.e., due to the fact that there
are no legitimate services or real devices that are actually using these addresses. Therefore,
any traffic with a destination IP address in the darknet is surely considered to be unso-
licited. Now darknets are commonly distributed on specific Internet IP address subspaces,
e.g., usually operated by Internet Service Providers (ISPs), educational and research enti-
ties, and corporate and backbone networks. However, darknet IP addresses are, by nature,
indistinguishable from other routable addresses, rendering them as an effective means to
amalgamate Internet-wide, one-way unsolicited network traffic. Along those lines, network
telescopes are used to identify network traffic originating from unsolicited IoT devices.
The proposed solution is illustrated in Figure 3.1. The overall rationale here is rendered
by initial empirical observations which confirm the hypothesis that, as compared to typical
Internet hosts, exploited IoT devices will attempt to propagate and infect other online IoT
devices. Specifically, related actions can include launching scanning activities towards the
Internet space or initiating DDoS attacks. In fact, most recently, malware such as Mirai,
Bashlite etc., have exhibited similar behaviors, wherein a central command and control
(C&C) setup is used to recruit infected devices in a bot network. These devices can then be
used to launch large scale DDoS attacks against targets, and these bots can also continue to
scan the Internet to infect other vulnerable devices.
In either case, depending upon the vantage points of the employed network telescopes, a
varying portion of such malicious activities will indeed target darknet IP address spaces. To
this end, well-established algorithms, methods, and techniques can be leveraged to scrutinize
darknet data, also termed as Internet Background Radiation (IBR), i.e., to fingerprint such
activities and infer sources of unsolicited IoT devices. In addition, corresponding darknet
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Figure 3.1: Network telescopes capturing Internet-scale IoT unsolicited traffic
traffic traces [48] can also be extracted here. For instance, such algorithms could leverage
threshold analysis to infer IoT-generated scanning activities or exploit backscattered packet
analysis (i.e., by analyzing reply packets originating from victims of DDoS attacks that have
been targeted by spoofed attackers to pinpoint targeted IoT devices).
In order to successfully recognize DDoS activities targeting IoT devices, this work ana-
lyzes close to 1.5 TB of real darknet data obtained from a /8 network telescope, as provided
by the CAIDA facility [49]. Carefully note that the proposed approach can only characterize
malicious IoT devices whose traffic targets the darknet, a limitation typically encountered
in network telescope analysis.
29
3.3 Leveraging Internet-Wide Scanning
Although empirical darknet data can help characterize Internet-scale malicious activities,
it still may not yield any insights into unsolicited IoT behaviors. Therefore, it is imperative
to also filter darknet sessions that originate from IoT devices. Now the task of fingerprinting
many different types of IoT devices by analyzing IBR is an open research challenge. Ac-
cordingly, this issue is addressed here by correlating packet information from the CAIDA
darknet data repository with data measurements obtained from Internet-wide scanning of
active IoT devices. Note that this correlation is performed mainly using source IP addresses
and transport layer protocol information (of the darknet sessions). Furthermore, the task of
identifying active IoT devices involves continuous probing of the Internet space for all active
devices, including IoT devices. Clearly, this approach is less efficient and will be unable to
provide real-time cyber operational capabilities which are crucial for mitigating large scale
orchestrated attacks.
In light of the above, instead of performing continuous Internet probing, measurement
archives from the Censys and Shodan facilities are used for correlation with darknet data.
Namely, both of these facilities probe the Internet for connected IoT devices and provide
this information in comma separated value (CSV) files. Specifically, the Shodan database
is built by scanning the entire IPv4 address space and usually provides IP addresses as well
as the type of device, operating system, etc. Meanwhile the Censys facility was developed
by a team at the University of Michigan and also supports another search engine to expand
the number of IP addresses and help consolidate results. Overall, 275,478 online IoT IP
addresses related to various device types, including, home automation devices, IoT cameras
and industrial control devices are gathered as noted in [48]
30
3.4 Correlating Active and Passive Measurements
In order to identify darknet sessions which belong to IoT devices, a novel correlation
algorithm is designed and implemented using Python, the overall pseudocode of which is
presented in Figure 3.2. Now given a list of source IP addresses in the darknet space and a
list of IoT-specific IP addresses from the IoT databases, a rudimentary linear search can be
performed i.e., to compare each IP address obtained from the passive measurements to those
from the active measurements. However, the time complexity of such an algorithm is of
order O(n2), and this is clearly unscalable for most high-volume scenarios. Hence in order to
address this concern, a hash table approach is developed based upon the active IP addresses
from Shodan. The passive measurements are then correlated with the active measurements
by searching the hash table for their associated entries, Figure 3.2. As a result, the resultant
run-time complexity is now reduced from quadratic to linear, i.e., O(n) since hash lookup is
an expected constant time operation.
Furthermore, another key challenge in correlating the two measurements is the need to
properly sanitize darknet data and filter out misconfiguration traffic. Namely traffic can
often be erroneously directed to the darknet due to software, hardware or routing errors.
Therefore such sessions need to be proactively identified and removed before any correlation
search is performed. Another concern relating to the Shodan and Censys databases is how
to identify relevant IoT device information. This identification can include device type, IP
address, geographical location, etc. Furthermore, there is also a need to properly download,
sanitize and store the obtained information. In general, the actual design of the correlation
algorithm is optimized for efficiency, especially since it is envisioned that such information
will be made available to the general research community and industry partners.
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1: INPUT: D,A
2: OUTPUT: C
3: for all ip ∈ A do . Convert list of active IoT IP addresses to a hash table
4: H ← h(ip)
5: end for
6: for all ip ∈ D do . Correlate active and passive measurements
7: if ip in H:
8: C ← ip
9: end for
10: return C . Return list of IoT IP addresses in darknet
Figure 3.2: Correlation algorithm for unsolicited IoT device identification
3.5 Generating IoT-Specific Malicious Signatures
Overall there is a notable lack of tangible malicious indicators that are derived from
empirical data in the context of IoT devices [50]. This shortcoming is also noted in Chapter
2 and can be attributed to various physical and logistical constraints that are often strictly
enforced by IoT operators. Additionally, analytic efforts in this domain (which aim at
addressing the distributed and heterogenous nature of the IoT ecosystem) are not yet mature
enough. In light of the above, there is an urgent need to address IoT security research
and development concerns. Accordingly, as noted in [48], the proposed methodology here
attempts to facilitate the generation of such artifacts. Specifically, performing network traffic
correlation between passive measurements (from CAIDA) and active IoT IP addresses (from
Shodan and Censys) can provide rare insights into Internet-scale activity of unsolicited IoT
devices. In turn, new insights into compromised device behaviors can be used to develop
signatures to help strengthen perimeter defenses for IoT networks. These signatures can also
be employed on new darknet sessions to fingerprint devices that have not yet been indexed
by databases such as Shodan and Censys. Finally, signatures can also be distributed to local
IoT realms to be used as part of IDS or IPS frameworks.
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To further support the aforementioned objectives, this effort uses the concept of fuzzy
hashing by tailoring and applying the Context Triggered Piecewise Hashing (CTPH) algo-
rithm [48] on darknet traces (that are generated by inferred unsolicited IoT devices). Overall,
the CTPH algorithm only operates in the current context of the input, i.e., maintaining its
state solely based upon the last few bytes of the data file. This operation ultimately produces
a pseudo-random value as output. The algorithm also generates discrete hashes by dividing
the file into multiple segments/blocks and computes hashes for these segments, i.e., instead
of computing a single hash for the entire file.
Essentially, the modified CPTH scheme uses a pre-determined block size, and the data
length is used to generate an initial block size. Subsequently, the Fowler-Noll-Vo (FNV)
algorithm is used to generate hashes on each byte of data, i.e., this algorithm produces a
32-bit output for any input. Then upon reaching a specified trigger value, further base 64
encoding is done for the last 6 bytes and added to the final signature [51]. This process is
repeated once again with twice the block size to improve the robustness of the algorithm.
Once the algorithm has run the entire length of data, a unique signature is generated for the
file. The algorithm then uses dynamic programming to calculate the edit distance, which is
essentially the benchmark used to identify similarity. Namely, the edit distance can be any
value between 0 and 100, with anything above 0 indicating correlation and 100 indicating
almost identical files. By contrast, most of the traditional hashing algorithms (such as
md5, SHA1 etc.) only generate binary outputs, i.e., even a single bit variation can provide
two uncorrected hashes. Therefore, the CTPH algorithm is much more robust to localized
changes and thus can provide a relative degree of similarity to better compare two files.
In the context of this work, the CPTH algorithm is used to generate signatures for IoT
devices based upon their IP header information. Specifically, the network layer information
of IoT devices found in the darknet (from the CAIDA data repository) is used here. The
primary motivation here is the fact that Layer 3 information from infected devices can be
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used to characterize them, i.e., since devices infected with (nearly) identical malware, viruses
etc. will exhibit similar characteristics (with the obvious exclusion of source and destination
IP addresses, checksum values, etc.).
Note that the time complexity of the basic CPTH algorithm is significantly higher than
other traditional algorithms such as Whirpool or md5 [52]. Hence given the huge amount
of darknet data involved, it is important to optimize the approach to increase efficiency and
reduce comparison time. To accomplish this objective, a tool called ssdeep [53] is also used.
Namely, this tool uses techniques (such as clustering and IntegerDB) to provide an optimum
method to compare the hash generated by ssdeep. The overall benefits here include reduced
memory requirements and faster processing times. Namely, the algorithm divides the hash
values generated by the ssdeep tool into chunks of varying sizes [53]. This approach gives
a reduced dataset since only files of the aforementioned chunk size need to be compared.
The tool also goes one step further by identifying overlapping chunks to further reduce the
number of comparisons, i.e., by only comparing the files that return a value greater than
zero. Overall, a number of benchmark tests are done with large datasets and the results
confirm the effectiveness of this proposed method.
3.6 Sharing of IoT Unsolicited Empirical Threat Information
In general the lack of real empirical threat information is a major hindrance when de-
veloping IoT security solutions. As a result it is proposed to publicly share the intelligence
extracted from darknet data with all stakeholders in the research and development commu-
nities. Specifically, such a facility will provide:
• Raw unsolicited IoT traffic traces to support large-scale data analytics by leveraging
rare empirical data
• Generated signatures to allow for further forensic IoT device investigations and use in
local realms for proactive inference and mitigation.
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Figure 3.3: Inferring and mitigating Internet-scale unsolicited IoT devices: A network tele-
scope approach
Accordingly, the insights generated here are indexed in an accessible database hosted
at the Florida Atlantic University. This setup includes near real-time information related
to Internet-scale compromised IoT devices coupled with their geolocation information and
generated signatures.
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3.7 Empirical Evaluation
This section elaborates upon the extracted inferences and insights derived by employing
the proposed methodology in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.3. Namely, passive darknet data and
correlated active measurements are used to identify IoT devices that have been compromised
on a global scale. In particular, IP addresses from the two databases (Shodan, CAIDA) are
first extracted for the month of December 2016. Similarly, darknet data is also analyzed for
the first 4 days of November 2016, December 2016, January 2017 and February 2017. On
each of these days, the data retrieved is for a six hour duration.
Now in order to enable effective characterization of IoT devices, it is important to under-
stand the type of devices that are most commonly found in the darknet (and if possible, the
protocols and operating systems they are using). Fortunately, both Shodan and Censys pro-
vide a range of statistics for IoT devices, including the type of device, which can range from
webcams, SCADA and Linux universal plug-and-play (UPnP) devices to modems, routers,
etc. Additionally, in many cases these search engines also provide information on the type
of operating system in use, associated ports and protocols, as well as ISP and manufacturer
information. Some detailed findings are presented now.
Overall, close to 165,000 IoT devices deployed in various SCADA environments are ex-
tracted, as show in Figure 3.4b. This category represents 55% of all extracted devices.
Meanwhile, DVRs and Bluetooth-enabled IoT devices are less prevalent, totaling close to
26% and 11% of the aggregate number of devices, respectively. The remaining 8% of inves-
tigated devices are rendered as IoT webcams and thermostats. As noted, darknet data from
the CAIDA repository is extracted for the months of November and December 2016 as well
as January and February 2017. However, only 30 hours of data is extracted and analyzed
over the duration of these 4 months since CAIDA monitors a very large network telescope.
Upon executing the correlation algorithm between the two measurements, the results
confirm the presence of almost 14,000 Internet-scale infected IoT devices. Foremost, this
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figure validates the initial hypothesis that a significant number of malicious IoT devices
exist in the wild, and that network telescopes provide an effective methodology to shed light
on Internet-scale unsolicited device behaviors. Furthermore, the IoT devices in Figure 3.5a
are also characterized in Figure 3.5b, and the results indicate that a significant portion of
compromised IoT devices are in fact DVRs, i.e., 64.3%. This value corroborates with the
rising exploitation of webcams and routers by the Mirai malware and its variants, i.e., to
launch crippling attacks as seen on the Dyn DNS server which ultimately affected wider
Internet connectivity [2]. Meanwhile, IoT devices deployed within SCADA realms (mostly
belonging to building automation systems, power utilities, and manufacturing plants) also
represent 28.4% of the total share of unsolicited devices found in the darknet. Again, this
is a very notable figure since such devices are often deployed in vital roles. Indeed, the
exploitation of such IoT devices may cause large scale economic losses and even endanger
human lives.
Finally, IoT webcams, thermostats and other Bluetooth-enabled devices are also found
to be compromised. Overall, the above inferences can be leveraged by the operational cyber-
security community (including IoT operators and manufacturers, cyber situational response
teams, etc.,) to aid in the rapid notification, and thus mitigation, of such attacks.
Finally, the hosting environments of the exploited devices are also characterized by iden-
tifying their geographical location, see Figure 3.6. This analysis reveals that most of the
infected IoT devices are located in Asia, followed by Europe and the Americas. In particu-
lar countries in Asia seem to have a significant portion of infected video recorders, whereas
SCADA-based IoT devices are most prevalent in Europe and the Americas. Furthermore,
carefully note that more precise information, such as the hosting and ISP organizations, is
also extracted. However these results are not revealed for privacy reasons.
As detailed in Section 3.5, IoT-specific malicious signatures are also generated by em-
ploying an open source implementation of the CTPH algorithm, namely the ssdeep utility.
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For proof-of-concept purposes, some samples signatures relating to 4 different IoT devices
are also shown in Fig 3.4a. Overall, these signatures represent one of the first known at-
tempts to capture notions of IoT maliciousness by scrutinizing empirical data. Also these
signatures can be deployed on new incoming darknet traces to fingerprint newly-exploited
IoT devices that have not yet been indexed by certain databases, e.g., such as Shodan and
Censys. Moreover, these signatures can also be employed by local IoT realms to aid in
mitigation, and thus remediation strategies.
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Figure 3.4: IoT devices: a) signatures and b) distributed by types
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Figure 3.5: Exploited IoT devices: a) by types and b) by type and region
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Figure 3.6: Global distribution of exploited IoT devices
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4 Malicious IoT Device Classification using Machine Learning2
The use of network telescopes in conjunction with active measurements in Chapter 3
presents a solid foundation for empirical IoT threat analysis. Also, the proposed correla-
tion algorithm along with its envisioned signature generation capabilities can help further
infer and characterize large scale malicious IoT behavior. However, as noted in Chapter 2,
signature-based schemes are not necessarily effective in identifying zero-day or new variants
of attacks. There is also the added overhead of maintaining a database to store signatures
for each IoT device in the network (and comparing them against darknet signatures). Fur-
thermore, most attacker behaviors generally evolve in parallel with defense methodologies,
as was observed in the case of Reaper, Hajime and Owari. Thus static signature generation
techniques by themselves are insufficient for addressing the rich threat landscapes facing IoT
devices.
Now, Chapter 2 also discussed the effectiveness of various ML and DL algorithms in solv-
ing practical cybersecurity problems across diverse domains, including IoT security. These
learning algorithms present a new perspective for analyzing system vulnerabilities by iden-
tifying patterns and/or anomalies in data. These methods are particularly useful in the
context of IoT security since related devices generate massive amounts of data (owing to the
“always on” philosophy) which is essential for building robust and accurate models. Finally,
as detailed in Chapter 3, Internet “sinks” (or blackholes) represent unused IP addresses with
no devices associated with them. Therefore any traffic directed towards these IP addresses
is not legitimate.
2Parts of this chapter were published in F. Shaikh et al. A Machine Learning Model for Unsolicited IoT
Devices by Observing Network Telescopes. In International Wireless Communications Mobile Computing
Conference, 2018. Permission included in Appendix B
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In light of the above, a proper characterization of such traffic will also offer invaluable
insights into attacker techniques and may also provide a stepping stone to build highly
robust and flexible security models. Hence, this chapter presents a characterization and
labelling taxonomy for unsolicited IoT devices found in the darknet, as detailed in [54].
Thereafter, multiple supervised ML algorithms are trained and tested on this data to identify
the malicious activities performed by IoT devices. The high accuracy of ensemble models
demonstrates the efficacy of the proposed approach in leveraging network telescopes and
using ML schemes to classify malicious IoT activity. Overall, the proposed taxonomy schema
(in conjunction with the ML models) will help further improve IoT cybersecurity situational
awareness.
4.1 Notation Overview
The requisite notation is presented first, see also Table 4.1. Foremost, headercsv is used
to denote a csv file containing the header information for malicious IoT devices found in the
darknet. Meanwhile, databasesql denotes a SQL implementation in Python that stores the
same header information for faster processing. Additionally, featurecsv is another csv file
containing the statistical features of IoT traffic from network telescopes. Similarly, feature
is defined as a vector of explanatory variables, and label is the assigned label for each instance
based on the taxonomy defined earlier.
The total number of trees used by the ensemble learners is denoted by T , and si and
ri represent the random subset of samples and the decision of a subset of predictors, re-
spectively. Also, M denotes the number of stages in gradient boosting, and Fm(x) is the
function updated at the mth stage. Finally, weights is a vector of weights used to maintain a
distribution over the dataset, and α decides the step size of the Gradient Boosting algorithm,
while β updates weights in the SAMME AdaBoost.
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Table 2: List of variables
Variable Description
headercsv IP header information of unsolicited IoT devices in a csv file
databasesql SQL database containing unsolicited IoT device information
unqip Unique IP in csv file containing header information
featurecsv Features for training ML models in csv file
feature Feature vector of samples for training ML model
label Label vector of samples for training ML models
Trees Total trees in a Random Forest algorithm
st Subset of samples used by weak classifiers in Random Forest
fi Subset of features used by weak classifiers in Random Forest
R Learned tree by Random Forest
M Number of stages in Gradient Boosting & Samme AdaBoost
L Loss function optimized in Gradient Boosting
Fm(x) Function learnt at m
th stage in Gradient Boosting
α Multiplier to decide step size in Gradient Boosting
β Variable to update weights in SAMME AdaBoost
C(x) Approximate Bayes classifier
weights Vector of weights for SAMME AdaBoost
4.2 Exploiting Network Telescopes to Infer Malicious IoT Behavior
The lack of empirical threat data for IoT devices is a major roadblock in applying ML
methods to IoT security problems, as noted in Section 3.3. This is due to the fact that ML
methods must be trained on sufficient amounts of data in order to make reliable decisions.
Although a few studies have attempted to address this concern by using simulation tech-
niques, the resultant traffic patterns do not necessarily reflect true attacker behaviors seen on
a global scale. However, the CAIDA repository monitors a large network telescope and makes
the measurement archives available for research and analysis. This massive IBR repository
contains various forms of illegitimate traffic, including but not limited to, backscatter from
DDoS attacks, scanning attempts by unsolicited devices, misconfiguration traffic, etc., [55].
Specifically, CAIDA provides IP header information such as source/destination IP address,
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source/destination port, protocol type, etc. Hence this network information can be used to
derive key insights into attacker scanning and exploitation strategies.
Along those lines, akin to [48], the network characteristics of IoT devices are extracted
from the CAIDA repository. The main motivation here is the fact that compromised IoT
devices will likely form part of a bot army and will typically exhibit similar traffic char-
acteristics as they scan the Internet for other vulnerable devices [2]. Now Chapter 3 has
shown that network telescopes can help infer and characterize Internet-scale malicious IoT
behaviors. Additionally, curating, processing and storing IP header information is compu-
tationally more efficient than payload-based analysis. Hence IP header information of IoT
devices found in network telescopes is utilized for training the ML algorithms here. This in-
formation includes their source/destination IP addresses, source/destination port numbers,
protocol numbers, etc. In general it is reasonable to expect infected devices to have similar
ports and applications actively engaging in scanning or DDoS attacks.
4.3 Darknet Data Categorization
Once the darknet data for unsolicited IoT devices is extracted from CAIDA, it becomes
imperative to categorize malicious IoT activities. Specifically, such a taxonomical scheme
will enable security administrators to label their own traffic and build models to identify
unsolicited device activity. However, darknet traffic is unique in a sense that there are no
legitimate devices associated with the IP addresses. This means that packets sent to these
addresses will not receive any replies. Hence, traditional classification-based mechanisms
that rely on both source and destination IP addresses are not suitable in this situation.
To address the above challenge, various efforts have analyzed network telescope traffic and
proposed data labeling schemes. Notably, [56] proposes a solution to detect compositional
changes in darknet data. The authors also develop a tool called iatmon that groups one way
traffic into two separate subnets based upon either the type of scanning being performed or
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on inter-arrival time distributions of packets from each source IP addresses. Similarly, [57]
proposes a classification scheme for detecting unsolicited darknet activity. Here, the authors
outline session models based upon 3 protocols, i.e., Transmission Control Protocol (TCP),
User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP). Thereafter,
the authors identify patterns in these darknet sessions to categorize malicious activities e.g.,
such as scanning, DoS, backscatter, etc. Finally, [58] and [59] also analyze network telescope
data to identify patterns and trends in Internet-scale malicious activities. Namely, [58]
proposes a taxonomy scheme that relies on traffic statistics for every source IP address seen
in the darknet. Specifically, the authors identify various types of scanning and backscatter
activities based on various metrics, e.g., such as the number of packets sent to a host, the
number of ports targeted, etc.
Overall, the above studies reaffirm the importance of network telescopes as a rich source
of Internet-scale malicious activity. However, these contributions do not account for IoT
devices or the rise of botnet malware such as Mirai, Reaper, etc. Hence, this Chapter tries
to address this concern by developing a taxonomy scheme for IoT IP addresses found in the
darknet. The rationale behind this labelling methodology, as noted in [54], is now presented.
4.3.1 Scanning
Unsolicited IoT devices are constantly trying to infect other Internet devices with similar
vulnerabilities. This is a common strategy used by malware such as Mirai to increase the
size of its bot network and thereby orchestrate larger scale DDoS attacks. As noted in [58],
darknet traffic patterns indicate the presence of various types of scanning activities. For
example, in port scanning the attacker identifies active ports on a host by sending it requests
packets. The motivation for this approach is to exploit a particular service or application
using that specific port. Therefore, if a specific source IP address is sending such packet
requests to multiple ports at unique darknet IP addresses, then it is identified as performing
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a port scan. Note that in case of TCP traffic, the percentage of total packets sent by source
IP addresses with either the SYN, FIN-ACK or NULL flags set must be greater than 50%.
Meanwhile, if an attacker targets the same port on multiple services, it is identified
as a network scan. This scanning activity is primarily meant to exploit a specific host
vulnerability. Again, this is apparent in the case of Mirai, which exploited open telnet ports
on various IoT devices such as webcams, DVRs etc., (which were recruited as part of a bot
network). Thus, if the presence of such activity is detected from a source IP address, then
the device is classified as performing a network scan. Additionally, akin to the case of port
scanning, the number of TCP packets with either the SYN, FIN-ACK or NULL flags set
must be greater than 50%.
Finally, many attackers often perform “stealth” scanning to evade detection by IDS/IPS
setups. In such an attack, a small number of TCP or UDP packets are sent to a small
number of hosts in a given time period. These attacks yield low memory footprints as they
target a small number of hosts, thereby evading detection. Thus, in the case of TCP, if a
source IP address sends less than 15 SYN packets to less than 15 hosts targeting less than
5 ports in a given time frame, it is identified as performing a stealth scan.
4.3.2 Backscatter
Backscatter packets observed in darknet data arise from a popular strategy used by
attackers known as IP spoofing. This technique is mainly exploited to hide the true identity
of the attacking device and involves spoofing the source IP address. IP spoofing is particularly
useful in the context of DoS or DDoS attacks, i.e., since the reply packets are sent to fake
IP addresses instead of the real attacker IP addresses. Now clearly there will be no response
to these packets if the spoofed IP addresses reside in the darknet [54]. Therefore any such
packets seen in the darknet are a clear indication of DDoS attacks and are labelled accordingly
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in the taxonomy scheme. This includes TCP packets with either the SYN-ACK, RST-ACK
or RST flags set.
Carefully note that any packet from an IoT device which does not meet either of the
above 2 criterion is labelled as misconfiguration traffic [54]. Such traffic can occur due to
various reasons, including incorrectly configured network address translation (NAT) rules,
routing tables errors, etc. However, this traffic generally constitutes a very small portion of
the overall total traffic and is treated as negligible here.
4.4 Feature Extraction from Network Telescopes
As noted in Chapter 2, ML techniques analyze data and learn patterns to generate useful
inferences. In general, these methods constitute a set of explanatory variables or features,
i.e., X = x1+x2+ ...+xn, that are used to predict values in case of regression or probabilities
in case of classification. Assuming that these outputs are termed as Y [60], the ML algorithm
estimates a function f that satisfies the following expression:
Y = f(X) + ε (1)
where ε is an irreducible error term with zero mean. Therefore the selection of explanatory
variables that yield the most accurate prediction or inference is one of the most important
goals of efficient ML algorithm design. Accordingly, [17] discusses the importance of selecting
relevant features to improve the performance of supervised learning algorithms. Indeed, the
presence of redundant or irrelevant features can have an adverse effect on the prediction
accuracy of the algorithm. Furthermore, [17] also notes that the number of features is
ultimately related to the number of samples, i.e., a larger number of features requires a
larger number of samples to maintain the same accuracy. Therefore in many cases the
number of samples needed can rise exponentially with every added feature.
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Now previous work in [61] and [62] has explored the application of ML techniques for
network traffic classification. For example, the authors in [61] discuss the impact of feature
selection in correctly classifying network traffic. More specifically, they argue that statistical
properties or flows are more efficient in distinguishing network traffic than simple port or
payload-based mechanisms. Similarly, [62] highlights the importance of relevant feature
selection for network traffic classification and also proposes a feature selection methodology
based on “concept drift”.
Overall traffic statistics generated from IP flow data have yielded very good results for
both supervised and unsupervised learning setups. Hence, a similar strategy is also adopted
here where features are derived from network traffic statistics of IoT IP addresses found in
the darknet. However, a key challenge here with regards to darknet traffic is that the traffic
is one-way and hence these conventional methods cannot be used to derive the necessary
features for ML. To address this concern, akin to [29] and [63], flows are now identified
by only using the source IP addresses of IoT devices found in the darknet. Essentially, the
important characteristics derived from the labelling methodology itself are used to derive the
features here, as summarized in Table 3. A primary motivation for selecting these features is
the fact that statistical values (such as the number of destination IP addresses and ports) are
closely related to both scanning and DDoS activity. Another important feature to consider
is also the total number of packets that each unsolicited IoT device sends to darknet IP
addresses. This count provides a good indication of the scanning strategy of an attacker.
4.5 Data Processing
The CAIDA measurement archives contain hour long compressed files of pcap data.
Therefore as per the methodology utilized in Chapter 2, IP header information is extracted
from this repository (along with relevant IoT device data) and placed in a CSV file. In
addition to the data obtained and processed in Chapter 2, added data from entire days in
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Table 3: Features for training ML algorithms
Feature Description
avg ttl Average ttl value for each src IP address
total packet count Total # of packets sent by each src IP address
num of unique destination IPs Total # of unique destination IP address targeted by each src IP address
avg of packets sent to port Average # of packets sent to each dest port by each src IP address
avg packets sent to IP Average # of packets sent to every dest IP by each src IP address
inter-arrival time Average inter-arrival time of packets sent by each source IP
scan flags # of packets sent with scan flags [SYN, FIN, FIN-ACK, NULL]
udp packets # of UDP packets sent by each src IP address
number of unique dest ports Total number of unique dest ports targeted by each src IP address
February and March 2017 is also extracted. This increased amount of information helps
improve the prediction capabilities of the ML models, i.e., by comparing their performance
on expanded datasets from different time periods.
A high level overview of the proposed malicious IoT activity classification methodology
is show in Figure 4.1. This solution involves labelling the above data using the taxonomy
proposed in Section 4.3. However the large size of the CSV files make it difficult to effectively
retrieve the required statistics. Hence, the above issue is addressed by first converting the
CSV files to a Structured Query Language (SQL) database, which significantly improves the
time required to label the network telescope data. Namely, this database is implemented in
Python and the labelled data is then stored in a CSV file. Furthermore, this database is also
used to retrieve the features required for training the ML algorithms.
Overall, the use of hash tables (coupled with the database implementation) significantly
reduces the time required to process the raw data retrieved from the CAIDA repository. The
overall pseudocode of the data taxonomy and feature selection scheme is presented in Figure
4.2.
50
Unsolicited IoT Device Inference
Network   Telescope Public IoT   Databases
IP Header 
Parsing
IP address correlation
Feature 
Extraction
Data 
Labelling
Raw 
Data
Malicious IoT Data Sharing
Data Sanitizing & Pre-Processing Learning Phase
Training Data
Testing Data
Machine  learning
Classification
Scanning
Backscatter
Misconfiguration
Other
Copyright c© 2018, IEEE
Figure 4.1: Proposed IoT device classification methodology
1: INPUT: headercsv
2: OUTPUT: databasesql
3:
4: for all row ∈ headercsv do
5: convert(databasesql ← row) . Convert CSV file to SQL database
6: return(databasesql)
7: end for
8: featurecsv = {}
9: for all unqip ∈ headercsv do . Extract features for each unique source IP
10: featurecsv ← (query SELECT feature for unqip from data)
11: return(featurecsv) . Return CSV file containing feature vectors
12: end for
Figure 4.2: Data labelling and feature selection algorithm
4.6 Machine Learning Models
Overall, the strong pattern recognition capabilities of ML-based models can be used to
derive unseen intelligence from data. This is clearly demonstrated by their highly successful
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application in various domains. Now Section 2.3 has already presented some recent literature
with regards to ML applications in IoT security, including the motivations behind using ML
models for darknet data analysis. Therefore, in this Chapter, popular ensemble models such
as Random Forest, Gradient Boosting and AdaBoost, which use decision trees as the weak
learners, are leveraged to classify malicious IoT activity. Namely ensemble learners are ML
algorithms that use multiple weak or base learners to solve either classification or regression
problems. The outputs from these learners are aggregated by either using majority voting
(classification) or weighted averaging (regression) [64]. Overall, the collective performance of
an ensemble learner is generally better than that of the individual learners as shown in [65].
Note, that the performance of the individual weak learners themselves is only slightly better
than random guessing, i.e., they are right about 50% of the time.
In general, decision trees represent a simple method to divide the predictor space into
smaller sub-spaces. Although these trees are easy to interpret and have been modeled some-
what after human decision making processes, these algorithms by themselves perform poorly
when compared to other supervised ML solutions [60]. Nevertheless, when coupled with
techniques such as boosting or bagging, the performance of decision trees can improve con-
siderably. Along these lines a brief description of these two techniques is provided here:
• Bagging: Averages the prediction of multiple weak learners trained on a random subset
(with replacement) of input data. This method also offers the advantage of parallel
operations since each model is trained independently.
• Boosting: Sequential operation to learn from residual errors of previous predictors.
This method is more resilient to overfitting. However, the sequential nature of opera-
tions makes it difficult to parallelize this scheme for runtime efficiency.
As can be seen in Figure 4.3, for the case of boosting, a random subset of samples S
= S1, S2, ..., Sn is selected to train each weak learner. The misclassified samples are then
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Figure 4.3: Boosting vs Bagging
included in the sub-samples used by the next model, i.e., the algorithm focuses on samples
it has misclassified to iteratively improve its performance.
On the other hand, bagging uses a random subset of samples (with replacement) to train
each weak learner and then simply computes the mean of the output of each model to give
a final prediction, see Figure 4.3 as well.
In light of the above, the Random Forest, AdaBoost and Gradient Boosting schemes are
trained on the data (which is labelled using the methodology detailed in Section 3.1). Note
that these ensemble methods have also been successfully applied in previous literature to
perform classification of non-malicious network traffic [66], as well as for detecting intrusion
activities by using them as part of an IDS [67]. Consider some further details.
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1: INPUT: feature = (x1, x2, x3, ...., xn), label = (y1, y2, y3, ...., yn), number of trees = T
2: OUTPUT: LearnedtreeR
3: Function RandomForest{feature, label}
4: R = {}
5: for all t ∈ Trees do
6: st ← random subset of sample
7: rt ← LearnTree(st, feature) . Learn tree for bagged samples
8: R← rt
9: end for
10: returnR
11: Function LearnTree{feature, label}
12: At each split:
13: fi ← random subset of feature . Improve variance by random selection of features
14: split on subset of features
15: ri ← LearnTree(fi, feature)
16: return ri
Figure 4.4: Random Forest algorithm
4.6.1 Random Forest
The Random Forest approach improves upon the bagging methodology by selecting a
subset of learners at each tree split, see pseudocode in Figure 4.4. For this approach, all
learners are used on the bootstrapped samples to make a decision [60]. However, as noted
earlier, this can lead to overfitting especially if the trees are highly correlated due to the
dominance of one or more strong predictors. Accordingly, the Random Forest scheme ad-
dresses this issue by only selecting a subset of models at each split instance. This strategy
(also known as bootstrap aggregating or bagging) ultimately helps reduce variance, since
each subset of predictors has its own variance, which is then averaged out in the final out-
put. The prediction accuracy is further improved by selecting only a subset of features at
each split to further reduce the variance of the model.
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1: INPUT: feature = (x1, x2, x3, ...., xn), label = (y1, y2, y3, ...., yn), stages = S, loss function =
L(label,labelestimated), weak learner = w(feature, param), multiplier = α
2: OUTPUT: Function optimized over parameter space: Fx
3: Function Gradient Boost{feature, label}
4: F0 =
∑n
i=1 L(yi, α)
5: for i = 1, 2, . . . , S do
6: for k = 1, 2, . . . , n do . Perform gradient descent optimization
7: ŷk ← -(partial derivative of L w.r.t Predictor F for kth sample)
8: end for
9: update model parameters
10: update α
11: Fm(x) = Fm−1(x) + α.w(feature, param) . Update sequentially
12: end for
13: return Fm(x)
Figure 4.5: Gradient Boosting algorithm
4.6.2 Gradient Boosting
The original Gradient Boosting machine algorithm proposed in [68] uses a stage-wise
additive process to estimate the best predictor/function (in the parameter space) and per-
forms numerical optimization using the steepest descent algorithm. This approach differs
from the Random Forest scheme in one very important way, i.e., Gradient Boosting relies
upon a sequential operation that learns from past weak learners, whereas Random Forest
averages out the prediction of the subset of weak learners. Hence this approach allows the
scheme to avoid the problem of overfitting, i.e., low variance model. However, as compared
to the Random Forest approach, the number of tunable parameters in the Gradient Boosting
scheme is also higher. The pseudocode for the general implementation of this algorithm is
also presented in Figure 4.5.
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1: INPUT: feature = (x1, x2, x3, ...., xn), label = (y1, y2, y3, ...., yn), stages = S, error, weights =
(w1, w2, ...., wn), w(feature, param), β
2: OUTPUT: Approximate Bayes Classifier: Cx
3: for i = 1, 2, . . . , n do . Normalize weights
4: wi = 1/n
5: end for
6: for i = 1, 2, . . . , S do . For every epoch
7: Fit weak classifier F (x) to training data using weights
8: errk =
∑n
i=1wi.P r(ci 6= w(feature, param))
9: Update β . Update β based on classifier error
10: Update & normalize w
11: end for
12: C(x) = argmaxj
∑S
i=1 β
i.P r(F
(i)
x j)
13: return C(x)
Figure 4.6: SAMME AdaBoost algorithm
4.6.3 AdaBoost
Another variation of boosting known as AdaBoost is also implemented to classify IoT
darknet data. AdaBoost is very similar to Gradient Boosting in the sense that both solu-
tions try to iteratively improve the performance of a single weak learner. However, whereas
Gradient Boosting uses residual errors to perform optimization, AdaBoost modifies a set of
weights or distribution associated with the input instances [69] to train the weak learners.
Hence the objective is now defined as reducing the error over this distribution rather than
performing optimization over some residual function space. Along these lines, the AdaBoost
implementation in [70] for multi-class classification is used here, i.e., termed as the Stagewise
Additive Modeling using a Multi-class Exponential loss function (SAMME). Accordingly, the
pseudocode for this algorithm is also presented in Figure 4.6.
Finally as per [54], a Naive Bayes scheme is also chosen for comparison purposes. This
algorithm fits a Gaussian distribution over the input data by assuming feature independence.
However, this assumptions may not hold in practice, especially in light of ever-mutating
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Internet traffic patterns. Despite these concerns, the Naive Bayes scheme can handle complex
inputs and its overall tractability makes it an ideal choice for a number of ML problem
applications [71].
4.7 Performance Evaluation
The above schemes are implemented using the Python scikit library, which includes
multiple supervised and unsupervised ML modules. In addition to this, diverse loss functions
and accuracy metrics are also provided to test the performance of the models. Overall, these
modules aid in rapid prototyping and testing of a wide array of ML models. Empirical
findings from various datasets are now presented, some of which are also discussed in [54].
Namely, the IP addresses of about 3 million IoT devices are extracted from various databases
including Censys, Shodan, etc. As noted in Chapter 3, these IoT devices belong to different
system categories such as SCADA, webcams, thermostats, DVRs, etc. A database of IP
addresses is then created and compared to the source IP addresses collected by the CAIDA
network telescope for a one hour period on the first day of January 2017. Indeed, the vast
size of this dataset makes it easier to train and test the proposed algorithms.
Overall, a total of slightly over 250,000 malicious IoT instances are found on the first
day of January 2017 via the CAIDA network telescope. As noted in Section 4.5, the IP
header information extracted here is also stored in a database for easier processing. The
features described in Section 4.4 are also extracted and labelled according to the pseudocode
algorithm in Figure 4.2. Based on this, a total of 208,647 IoT IP addresses are classified
as performing scanning, 10,628 as sending backscatter traffic and 72,794 IPs are labelled as
misconfiguration traffic. Now as noted in Section 4.6, the Random Forest, Gradient Boosting,
Ada Boost and Naive Bayes schemes are used for classifying darknet data. Specifically, 70%
of the data is used for training and the remaining 30% is used for testing. This partitioning
is done using a random split function in the scikit library and a 5-fold cross-validation is
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also done on the dataset. Also, precision and recall metrics are used to gauge the efficiency
of the proposed schemes. Namely, precision is defined (in ML literature) as the percentage
of a particular class C that are truly classified as class C among all instances which are
classified as class C. Mathematically, precision can be defined as the ratio tp
tp+fp
, where tp
is the number of true positives and fp is the number of false positives. On the other hand
recall is defined as the percentage of members of a class C that are correctly classified as
belonging to class C. Mathematically, this value can also be represented as the ratio tp
tp+fn
where fn stands is the number of false negatives.
Furthermore, two variants of the AdaBoost algorithm [70] are also implemented, i.e.,
depending on what parameter the algorithm uses to adapt in every iteration. Specifically,
AdaBoost1 adapts based upon predicted class label errors, whereas AdaBoost2 adapts based
upon class probabilities [72]. For the Random Forest scheme, the tree depths are also varied
between 2 and 3, and these variants are denoted as Random Forest1 and Random Forest
2, respectively. Overall, findings show, that higher depth values do not provide significant
improvements in performance. Finally, the Naive Bayes algorithm is run with both normal-
ized and non-normalized data, and results show that the latter gives higher accuracy and
recall scores. Hence only results for the non-normalized data are presented here. The overall
results for all schemes are presented in Table 4.
To further validate the efficacy of the proposed ML models, tests are also done using
data from different time periods. This approach helps avoid the problem of overfitting or
high variance that might arise due to a large number of testing samples being drawn from
the same time period. This strategy also helps assess how attack behavior changes over
time. Accordingly, IP header information from IoT devices found in the CAIDA dataset on
the first days of February and March 2017 is extracted. Based upon the detailed labeling
methodology, it is determined that over 1.7 million IoT devices are performing scanning
activities and over 100,000 devices are sending backscatter traffic. Furthermore a meagre
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7,764 are classified as generating misconfiguration traffic in February 2017. Furthermore,
in March 2017, the number of devices performing scanning drops to 1.2 million and the
number sending backscatter drops to 80,000, see Figure 4.8. Note the parameters used here
are the same as those used for the January 2017 dataset. For training purposes, the same
methodologies proposed earlier are re-used and the detailed findings for these 2 months are
presented in Tables 5 and 6
Overall, as can be seen in Figure 4.7a, the Gradient Boosting scheme outperforms all
other algorithms, both in terms of accuracy and precision scores. This approach is followed
closely by the Random Forest scheme, and finally the AdaBoost and Naive Bayes methods
(with Naive Bayes performing the worst). The low performance of Naive Bayes method can
be attributed to its independence assumption between all features, which is clearly not the
case for network traffic. From Figures 4.7b and 4.8a, it is also seen that for the February and
March 2017 datasets, the performance (recall and precision scores) only deteriorates slightly
with the Gradient Boosting and Random Forest schemes, whereas it drops significantly for
the Naive Bayes method. Overall, the very small drop in performance with Gradient Boosting
and Random Forest indicates that these methodologies are quite effective for classifying
malicious IoT traffic, i.e., the algorithms seem to have avoided overfitting.
The reduced performance of the Random Forest scheme can also be attributed to the fact
that it is a high variance scheme and thus prone to overfitting. Although this algorithm does
not perform as well as the Gradient Boosting approach, in many practical applications it is
preferred due to its parallelized nature. Thus, practical constraints such as the large volume
of data and requirement of real-time classification can result in the Random Forest scheme
being selected over the Gradient Boosting scheme. However, the latter excels at handling
outliers, selecting important variables and even performs well with missing data. Hence the
trade off, as is often the case with any ML algorithm selection, lies between computation
cost and prediction accuracy [72].
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Table 4: Recall and precision values for the January 2017 dataset
Metric NaiveBayes AdaBoost1 AdaBoost2 Random Forest1 Random Forest2 Gradient Boost
Recall 75.63 72.99 89.32 93.93 96.19 99.88
Precision 82.43 82.81 93.24 93.72 96.41 99.88
Table 5: Recall and precision values for the February 2017 dataset
Metric NaiveBayes AdaBoost1 AdaBoost2 Random Forest1 Random Forest2 Gradient Boost
Recall 57.53 96.16 95.74 95.63 98.04 99.97
Precision 97.56 98.74 96.40 95.55 97.77 99.61
Table 6: Recall and precision values for the March 2017 dataset
Metric NaiveBayes AdaBoost1 AdaBoost2 Random Forest1 Random Forest2 Gradient Boost
Recall 60.14 97.17 96.60 93.32 98.33 99.90
Precision 95.54 99.01 95.59 93.67 96.72 99.43
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Figure 4.7: Recall and precision scores for: a) January 2017 and b) February 2017
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5 IoT Threat Detection Leveraging Network Statistics and GAN
The IoT device characterization methodology presented in Chapter 3 offers some novel
insights into Internet-scale malicious behavior and can help in updating security defenses
based on the type of activity being performed. Furthermore, the ML framework and unique
taxonomy developed in Chapter 4 can help extract additional intelligence for identifying
threats to and from IoT devices and is also highly effective in distinguishing between the
various malicious behaviors of IoT devices, i.e., scanning, backscatter etc. However, as noted
in Chapter 2, attacker behaviors are continually evolving from simple brute force techniques
to more sophisticated methodologies. In fact, adversaries are now developing remote code
exploits to target specific services or applications on a device. Indeed, the rise of Mirai-based
malware variants with more advanced code bases and complex attack strategies is a clear
indication of such new and emerging cyber threats.
In light of the above, traditional security mechanisms that rely on a database of malicious
signatures or static methods to identify behavioral anomalies will prove insufficient. To
address this concern, this Chapter presents a novel GAN-based framework that is trained
to identify known and zero-day threats against IoT devices from both inside and outside
the network perimeter. A use case for NFV is also presented that demonstrates how to
apply this new networking paradigm to aid in IoT threat mitigation. In particular, the
proposed solution leverages GANs (which excel at generating latent representations of high-
dimensional complex datasets) to create a normal profile for IoT devices. Specifically, a
GAN is trained to distinguish between normal and anomalous network traffic for 3 IoT
devices in an experimental network lab testbed. Furthermore, to validate the efficacy of this
solution, data from additional IoT devices (released by other researchers) is also utilized.
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This is used to overcome potential overfitting issues which may occur due to the limited
sample size of 3 IoT devices. Finally, well-established firewall and IDS software setups are
also used to effectively mitigate threats from IoT devices once they have been identified by
the GAN-based solution.
5.1 Experimental Setup
The proposed experimental network setup consists of 3 IoT devices that have been em-
pirically shown to be vulnerable to popular malware (such as Mirai). A holistic overview of
this setup is presented in Figure 5.1.
Netgear DGN 2200 Yi Home Camera 
Ubuntu server 
Esxi Hypervisor
Mirai C&C VM 
Mirai Scanner VM 
Pfsense virtual router 
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Internet 
Figure 5.1: Holistic overview perspective of the experimental testbed attack setup
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Overall, webcams and DVRs have seen a surge in popularity owing to their low cost and
ease of use. Furthermore, many device manufacturers are also offering cloud-based services
for storing and processing data collected by various sensors. A similar trend has also been
observed in the Wifi access points/routers market, where manufacturers are providing users
with very fine-grained bandwidth control capabilities in addition to various firewall and
security features. However, these devices also present very lucrative targets for malicious
actors since most users do not change their default username and passwords. As such, this
makes it very easy for bad actors to use brute-force techniques (by exploiting manufacturer-
specific credentials) on a large number of devices and recruit them as part of a bot network.
Indeed, analyzing the Mirai malware reveals a list of default usernames and passwords that
have been used to gain successful administrative privileges on IoT devices. Thereafter,
depending upon the underlying architecture, binaries can be downloaded to these devices to
communicate with the malware C&C setup and launch DDoS attacks or recruit other devices.
In light of the above, several representative systems are used to build the experimental
testbed of compromised IoT devices. In particular, the Netgear DGN 2200 router, Samsung
IP camera and the Yi Home Camera 1080p are chosen to demonstrate the effectiveness of
the proposed GAN frameworks, see Figure 5.1.
Now, the Netgear router has known remote code execution vulnerabilities which can be
exploited to gain administrative privileges on the device. Essentially, these exploits include
the HTTP POST command that can exploit the UPnP feature to allow cross-site forgery
attacks. As noted earlier, bot attacker behaviors are evolving constantly and no longer
rely on simple brute force techniques. Hence, to further test the efficiency of the proposed
solutions, the aforementioned vulnerabilities are also exploited here.
Additionally, the Metasploit offensive security module (on the Kali Linux operating
system) is also utilized to carry out additional attacks on the IoT devices. Namely, this
version of Linux is a Debian-based operating system that contains numerous exploitation
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tools/applications that are often used by professional penetration testers to identify weak-
nesses in a service, device, or network [73]. In particular the Metasploit framework in Kali
Linux provides a number of exploit payloads as well as auxiliary and post exploitation mod-
ules for multiple architectures and operating systems.
Also, the experimental testbed setup uses the VMware ESXI hypervisor to help support
VM instances. This virtualization software provides a simplified user interface for deploying
multiple virtual machines that can run on most operating systems (with multiple use cases
in traditional networks as well as the cloud). Now, a key advantage of the ESXI solution is
its seamless separation of the guest operating system from the underlying hardware. This
hypervisor also provides centralized management support along with performance improve-
ments (as well robust storage and backup capabilities). As a result, multiple VMs can be
established to host the C&C center for the Mirai and Bashlite malware. Furthermore, an-
other VM instance is also created to run the Apache web server. Therefore once the attacker
has gained administrative privileges on the IoT device, it can redirect it to this web server
to download the relevant malware binaries.
Finally, the pfsense tool is also used as a virtual firewall and router to handle all network-
ing tasks. This software offers increased flexibility and scalability, as well as a centralized
management capability, i.e., key enablers of the NFV paradigm. Additionally, pfsense can
also be extended to support packages such as Snort, OpenVPN, etc., through its package
management system. Finally, this tool also provides a centralized view of all resources within
a network along with a web graphical user interface for easy implementation of access control
and firewall policies. This capability is particularly useful as when a device is infected and
it needs to be isolated from the rest of the network (until appropriate remediation).
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5.2 Attack Methodology
Overall, multiple attack strategies are adopted in the experiment to ensure that a suf-
ficient breadth of malicious activities are covered. Along these lines, Table 8 presents a
brief summary of all the attacks that are conducted. As noted in Section 5.1, the Metas-
ploit module in Kali Linux is used to launch slightly more discrete attacks on the network,
i.e., in addition to deploying the Mirai and Bashlite malware. Now the source code for
both the Mirai and Bashlite malware contains a list of default usernames and passwords for
brute-forcing. Hence, once a vulnerable device has been identified, the malware launches
a dictionary attack using the aforementioned list to gain administrative access. Note that
Mirai also has a list of IP address ranges that it is directed to avoid, e.g., including addresses
belonging to the US Department of Defense (DoD), US Postal Service, as well as IP ranges
belonging to internal networks. Since IoT devices are hosted in an internal network in the
experimental setup of Figure 5.1, the relevant lines in the Mirai source code are appropriately
edited. Now once infected, the application binaries are downloaded from the loader server.
Thereafter, the infected device attempts to scan and recruit other vulnerable devices in the
network. Finally, the adversary can launch a targeted DDoS attack using all devices as part
of its bot network. Accordingly, a brief overview of Mirai’s attack strategy is also shown in
Figure 5.2. By contrast, Bashlite has a much simpler code base and hence the client-server
model is used here instead of the original Internet Relay Chat (IRC) based version. Note
that the 3 IoT devices and the attacker VMs are located in different sub-networks in order
to emulate real-world attack scenarios.
In addition, the Nessus module in Kali Linux is also used here. Specifically, this module
is capable of launching a variety of web attacks, e.g., such as checking for default credentials
and web application scanning. Meanwhile, the Nmap module is also used to perform a
scan of the entire network. Overall, Nmap provides a lot of potentially useful information,
including the operating system of a device, the underlying architecture it is running on, as
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Figure 5.2: Mirai attack strategy
well as a list of all its open ports. Such a tool is especially useful during the reconnaissance
phase of an attack, where the adversary tries to identify weaknesses in a system, ultimately
enabling them to craft specific exploits to target a particular type of device.
As noted earlier, the Netgear DGN 2200 router used in the experimental testbed has
multiple publicly-listed vulnerabilities, a brief description of which is also given in Table 7.
Hence, the firmware of this router is appropriately downgraded to carry out the attacks noted
earlier, i.e., since its latest firmware is patched and no longer vulnerable to the aforementioned
attacks.
Table 7: Exploits against Netgear DGN 2200
Vulnerability Description
Command Injection Command injection using special post request
Remote Command Execution Access to default user account
Cross-site request forgery Unauthenticated remote code execution
Furthermore, in addition to the above-detailed attacks on the devices themselves, addi-
tional MITM attacks are also carried out on the 2 IoT cameras. These attacks are facilitated
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by the fact that the cameras directly connect to the network over the WiFi network. Ac-
cordingly, the MITM attack is performed by using the address resolution protocol (ARP)
caching technique. Namely, the adversary presents itself as a legitimate access point (AP),
i.e., by broadcasting the MAC address of the legitimate gateway. This essentially deceives
the devices into connecting to the rouge AP, thereby enabling the attacker to observe all
communications with the real AP. In particular, a wireless adapter with packet injection
capabilities is used to perform the MITM attack on the 2 IoT cameras.
Table 8: Attacks against IoT network
Attack Netgear DGN2200 Yi camera 1080p Samsung IP camera
Nmap scanning Yes Yes Yes
Command injection Yes No No
Nessus scanning Yes No Yes
Remote code execution Yes No No
Mirai Yes Yes Yes
Bashlite Yes Yes Yes
MITM No Yes No
5.3 Overview of GAN
Deep generative models have recently become extremely popular due to their ability
to learn underlying complex data patterns. Key examples of such methodologies include
variational auto-encoders, GANs and autoregressive models. Overall, these models attempt
to evaluate (explicitly or implicitly) the probability distribution of their input datasets. As
a result, these DL models have found many applications in numerous and diverse areas such
as image classification, natural language processing, etc [74]. Briefly consider the evolution
of such generative models.
An early attempt to learn arbitrary dataset distributions was presented via the Boltzmann
machine framework. This technique can be implemented using a multilayer perceptron (with
maximum likelihood) in which case the learning rule becomes “local”, i.e., nodes update their
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weights only based upon the output of their immediate neighbors, akin to human biology.
Essentially this solution defines a joint probability distribution over the feature variables
using an energy function which can be expressed as follows:
P (x) =
e−f(x)
Z
(2)
where P (x) is the joint probability distribution of the input variables, f(x) is the energy
function, and Z is an intractable partition function that ensures that the sum of probabilities
remains one. Similarly, the Restricted Boltzmann machine is another multilayer perceptron
scheme which uses a single hidden layer and forms the basis for many DL models. The unique
properties of this scheme yield conditional distributions which are simpler to compute, and
the associated derivations are further detailed in [75].
As defined in [75] generative models, such as the Boltzmann machine, transform samples
of latent (hidden) variables z (uniform distribution with zero mean and unit standard devi-
ation) in to data samples X (or a distribution over these samples using some differentiable
function). Also, [75] notes that generating samples from more complex distributions requires
the use of feedforward networks that represent a family of non-linear functions whose pa-
rameters are updated through training. The authors also note that two main approaches
are used here, including a conditional distribution over the data or direct sampling. Overall,
the key challenge here involves learning the generator mapping from Z to X
Overall, GANs belong to the category of aforementioned models that are used to capture
conditional distributions. Along these lines, [76] presents an adversarial-based framework
for estimating a generative model. Essentially, this approach consists of two neural networks
competing in a zero-sum game. Namely, the generator’s distribution is first learned (over
the data set) by mapping Z to the space manifold of X using a differentiable multilayer
perceptron. Note, differentiability is an important condition for using the stochastic descent
algorithm for backpropogation. Meanwhile, the second multilayer perceptron, termed as the
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discriminator, tries to identify whether or not a given sample came from the actual data
set or the mapped distribution. This overall scheme is shown in Figure 5.3 and the reader
is referred to [76] for a more thorough treatment, i.e., including proofs of optimality and
algorithm convergence.
Generator
Discriminator 
Network
Loss Function
z
fake 
x
xTraining data
Figure 5.3: Overview of generative adversarial network (GAN)
Nevertheless, an important drawback with generative models (unlike variational auto-
encoders) is that they cannot perform inference owing to the implicitly learned distribution.
Hence, [77] attempts to solve the inference problem by requiring the discriminator to distin-
guish between the joint distribution over the data and latent space in a GAN framework.
The joint learning over the two distributions enables the algorithm to identify wether a
query image is from the same distribution as the data. This approach is also known as
Adversarially Learned Inference (ALI) GAN and detailed further.
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5.3.1 ALI GAN
The primary difference of the ALI GAN scheme versus the traditional GAN approach is
that the generator now consist of two distinct components called the encoder and decoder.
A zero sum game is then played between the discriminator and the generator, wherein the
discriminator is now expected to identify data generated form both the encoder and the
decoder. Accordingly, the value function for this game is defined as:
V (D,E,G) = Eqx [logD(x,Gz(x))] + Epz [1− logD(Gx(z), z)] (3)
where qx is the encoder data distribution, pz is the latent distribution, and D and G are the
generator and discriminator functions respectively. Once the encoder, decoder and discrimi-
nator networks have been learnt (trained), the model in [77] performs gradient descent on the
discriminator network ,which is then propagated to both the encoder and decoder networks.
As mentioned earlier, this approach differs from the traditional GAN in the sense that the
discriminator attempts to learn a mapping from the latent space to the space manifold and
vice-versa as shown in Figure 5.4.
In light of the above, the loss can now be represented as a convex multimodal function
and is defined as follows:
L(x) = αLG(x) + (1− α)LD(x) (4)
where, LG is the generator loss (which measures how similar a sample from the latent space
is to the actual data) and LD is the discriminator loss (generally cross-entropy which tries to
improve the samples yielded by the generator). In particular LD can also be defined as a loss
based on a feature matching methodology where the features of an intermediate layer of the
discriminator are used to compute the loss instead of the scalar output of the discriminator
network [78].
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Figure 5.4: Overview of ALI GAN framework
Overall the proposed GAN-based solution adopts a similar strategy to [77], where the
encoder, decoder strategy is used to train the discriminator. Namely, the generator produces
samples from both latent and sample space distributions.The overall pseudocode for this
procedure is shown in Figure 5.5.
5.3.2 AnoGAN
The GAN-based model presented in [78], termed as AnoGAN, is also implemented here.
This model uses the feature matching methodology for computing the discriminator loss
as mentioned earlier, although it does not use the decoder/encoder architecture mentioned
in [77]. However, the authors do induce inference in the network by randomly sampling
from the latent space (Z) and passing it through the generator neural network (G(z)). The
resultant output is then compared with the query input (x) and the difference is called the
residual loss. Thus, the overall loss function in this case is defined as follows:
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1: INPUT: feature = (x1, x2, x3, ...., xn), label = (y1, y2, y3, ...., yn), Initialize network parameters
for G, D, E
2: OUTPUT: Learned networks for G,D,E
3: while not converged do
4: q(x)← x1, x2, ...., xn
5: p(z)← z1, z2, ...., zn
6: Sample zi from q(z|x) . Sample form data distribution
7: Sample xifrom p(x|z) . Sample form latent distribution
8: d1 ← probability match encoder . Check discriminator output for encoder network
9: d2 ← probability match decoder . Check discriminator output for decoder network
10: Compute LD . Compute discriminator loss
11: Computer LG . Compute generator loss
12: Update parameters for G,D,E
13: end while
Figure 5.5: ALI GAN model for IoT threat detection
L(x) = (1− α)LR(x) + αLD(x) (5)
where, LR is the residual loss (which measures how similar the generated data is to the query
data) and LD is the discriminator loss based on the feature matching methodology.
Overall, the ALI GAN architecture in [77] along with the aforementioned AnoGAN
schemes are implemented here, akin to [62] (although the authors therein use the BiGAN
architecture). A summary of the different GAN architectures implemented here is presented
in Table 9. Overall, the neural networks used for the generator, discriminator and encoder
are implemented using the Tensorflow library. Specifically, these networks are built using
fully-connected or dense layers since non-image data is being processed. Namely, the encoder
neural network consists of 3 layers with 128, 64 and 32 nodes/units. Similarly, the decoder
network consists of two layers with 128 and 64 nodes each. The Adam optimizer is also
used here for training the GANs, along with 500 iterations of gradient descent for AnoGAN
scheme, akin to [78].
74
Table 9: Description of GAN models
Model Description
AnoGAN CE AnoGAN with cross-entropy loss
AnoGAN FM AnoGAN with feature matching loss
ALIGAN CE ALI GAN with cross-entropy loss
ALIGAN FM ALI GAN with feature matching loss
5.4 Data Processing and Feature Selection
Feature selection plays a vital role in the effectiveness of any DL model. Ideally, flow based
statistics have performed well for network traffic anomaly detection, as noted in Chapter
2. Along those lines, pfsense is used to capture network traffic from all devices in the
experimental test network in Figure 5.1. In particular, the feature selection methodology is
applied for bidirectional flows over 4 windows that span the most recent 50, 100, 500, 1,000,
and 2,000 packets. Overall, these packet windows provide varying resolutions of network
activity and the driving intuition here is that malicious IoT devices will either attempt to
scan, attack or infect another devices resulting in a change in network activity. Additionally,
the mean and standard deviations of the number of packets, packet lengths, and packet inter-
arrival times are also calculated. As a result, a total of 12 features are generated over a 5
window period yielding a total of 60 features which are indexed by their source IP addresses.
A further description of these features is also presented in Table 10
Overall, 70,000 instances of benign data and 3,000 instances of malicious data are ex-
tracted from the experimental testbed. These samples include data from the 3 IP cameras
and the Netgear router. The previously-detailed GAN models are also trained on this dataset
and then tested using both the malicious and benign samples.
For comparison purposes, a different hypothesis is also evaluated here. Namely, the GAN
network is also trained on the darknet data extracted in Chapter 3. As noted earlier, network
telescopes (such as those at the CAIDA facility) provide passive measurements of Internet-
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Table 10: Description of features selected for GAN learning
Feature Description
Number of packets Mean & std of total number of packets
Packet length Mean & std of length of packets
Number of unique ports Utilized ports
Packet inter arrival time Mean & std of inter-arrival time
TCP If using TCP as communication protocol, 0 if UDP
PSH flag Number of packets with PSH flag set
URG flag Number of packets with URG flag set
Idle time Duration for which the connection was idle
Active Duration for which the connection was active
scale unsolicited IoT behavior. However, the feature selection is done in a slightly different
manner here. Specifically, the one-way features of the unsolicited IoT devices in the darknet
data are extracted, as detailed in Chapter 4. Now a GAN trained on this darknet data
should be capable of identifying anomalous IoT traffic as belonging to the same distribution
as malicious IoT data found in the darknet. As a result any benign traffic generated by the
IoT devices should be flagged as “anomalous”.
Furthermore, the network dataset from [19] is also analyzed here, which consists of net-
work traffic data from 28 IoT devices. Namely, this study analyzes and identifies the sta-
tistical characteristics of multiple IoT devices. Now a key contribution of [19] is that the
authors make a subset of the dataset publicly available for other researchers. Therefore,
this data is used to train the proposed GAN model in addition to the benign data of the
IoT devices detailed earlier. Overall, this diversified dataset allows one to better overcome
potential overfitting concerns that might occur due to the limited number of devices in the
initial setup and truly the test the prediction powers of the model. Along these lines, close
to 250,000 benign instances are extracted from the dataset in [19], in addition to the 70,000
instances already extracted earlier. However, the total number of malicious samples in this
case remains unchanged at 3,000. Carefully note that even though two benign samples may
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originate from different networks, the objective is still to capture the statistical characteris-
tics (which are agnostic to specific variables like IP addresses, operating system type, etc.).
Finally, the performance of the Random Forest and the Gradient Boosting algorithms
are also compared using the aforementioned augmented IoT dataset. As detailed in Chapter
4, these ensemble learners combine the outputs of multiple weak learners to provide highly
accurate and low variance models. However, these supervised learning schemes required
labelled data for training purposes, i.e., both benign and malicious samples are used to train
the models.
5.5 Performance Evaluation
Detailed performance results for the various datasets are now presented. First of all,
Figure 5.6a plots the overall precision and recall scores for all the schemes i.e., ALI GAN
and AnoGAN as tested on the data collected from the 3 IoT devices. Here it is seen that
the AnoGAN model using feature matching loss yields a precision score of 100% whereas
the recall score is only 79.99% when applied to benign IoT samples from the experimental
testbed network. These results indicate that the model is successfully able to distinguish
between benign and malicious samples. However, the low recall score is a clear indication
that the lack of samples restricts the learning effectiveness of the AnoGAN network, i.e.,
the network misclassified some benign samples as malicious. Similarly, the ALI GAN model
using feature matching loss yields a precision score of 100% and a recall score of 84.56% when
trained on the data of the 3 IoT devices in the experimental test network. However, the
100% precision scores for all the models might be an indication of overfitting as the number
of samples provided to the models is very small.
Next, test results are presented using the datasets in [19]. Namely, the AnoGAN model
trained on this augmented IoT dataset had a precision score of 99.30% and a recall score of
82.34%, as shown in Figure 5.6b. These results indicate that the AnoGAN model benefits
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from the additional samples added to the distribution. A similar observation is also noted
with the ALI GAN model, which gives a precision score of 100% and a recall score of 89.21%.
Note that the performance of the ALI GAN model is considerably better than that of the
AnoGAN model. These results indicate that the simultaneous learning of both latent and
data distributions helps improve the inference power of the network.
Similarly, the performance of the GAN models trained on anomalous samples from the
darknet are also presented in Figure 5.7a. Note, the precision scores in this case indicate
how many relevant anomalous samples are selected, i.e., how efficient is the GAN in distin-
guishing anomalous and benign traffic. Meanwhile, the recall scores indicate how effective
the GAN network is in learning the anomalous darknet data distribution. Once again, the
ALI GAN model outperforms other GAN variants with precision and recall scores of 98.1%
and 80.21% respectively. An important observation here is that changing the loss method-
ology from feature matching to cross-entropy does not result in any significant improvement
in performance. In fact, both the ALI GAN and AnoGAN models have almost the same
precision and recall scores for the two different loss methodologies.
As noted earlier, the supervised learning algorithms used in Chapter 4, namely Random
Forest and Gradient Boosting, are also evaluated here for comparison purposes. Overall,
Random Forest gives a precision score of 97.29% and a recall score of 97.3%. The Gradient
Boosting method also gives a precision score of 100% and a recall score of 98.90%. However,
a major drawback with these algorithms is the fact that they require both benign and
malicious data for training, whereas the GAN model only needs benign samples. This is
a key distinction, since in local IoT realms, the GAN-based model would be much more
preferable as it only requires data packets from devices directly connected to the actual
network being safeguarded.
Finally, a comparison of the inference times of the various schemes is also presented in
Figure 5.7b. In particular this is a measure of time it takes for the algorithm to predict
78
outputs for a given number of test samples. The overall findings indicate that the AnoGAN
model takes the longest amount of time followed by the Gradient Boosting and Random
Forest methods. Meanwhile, the ALI GAN network with both the encoder and the generator
models yields the smallest inference time. In fact, the inference time is a magnitude of order
difference compared to AnoGAN performance.
Note that once a device is identified as malicious or anomalous, an automated Python
script is run to update an IP address list which is used by pfsense to block all communications
from that device. This enables fast threat mitigation along with ease of automation and
programming. As such, this approach mimics an SDN/NFV setup where NFV components
and a centralized SDN philosophy can be used to simplify threat mitigation in complex IoT
ecosystems. Furthermore, the aforementioned DL models can also be deployed as individual
VM instances in various network segments, i.e., with each GAN model trained for the devices
in that particular sub-network.
Overall, the results confirm that using a GAN model (to train the discriminator to
distinguish between the latent and sample space) yields the best results. This solution also
gives the smallest inference times. Although these findings are quite promising, the overall
GAN-based methodology needs to be further evaluated using more diverse and expanded
datasets to better gauge its effectiveness. Furthermore, such GAN models can also be applied
to other layers of the communication network to help identify anomalous behaviors.
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Figure 5.6: GAN performance on a) 3 IoT devices b) 31 IoT devices
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6 Concluding Remarks
This research dissertation focuses on the IoT security problem and leverages empirical
observations and network telescopes to develop defense frameworks to help identify threats
to the IoT ecosystem. A brief summary of this dissertation is provided.
First, Chapter 2 begins by presenting a survey of the novel protocols and technologies
being developed to accelerate the growth of IoT. This is followed by a discussion on the
unique challenges associated with securing IoT devices. Finally, a review of ML and DL
applications in the context of IoT security is also presented here. Thereafter, Chapter 3
proposes and evaluates a novel approach to infer, characterize and attribute unsolicited IoT
devices by correlating active and passive measurements. In addition to this, IoT specific
artifacts are also generated using the CPTH (hashing) algorithm. Subsequently, Chapter 4
proposes a unique taxonomy and labeling methodology for malicious IoT activities observed
in network telescope data. Additionally, an ensemble learner framework is also proposed and
evaluated to classify the malicious activities noted earlier. Finally, Chapter 5 proposes and
evaluates a GAN-based framework that is capable of identifying known and zero-day threats
from both internal and external sources to an IoT network.
Overall, the proposed methodologies present a novel data-driven approach (based on
network traffic statistics) to defend against rising threats to IoT devices from malware such
as Mirai and its variants. Indeed these exploits can potentially have debilitating effects on
large scale Internet infrastructure and critical industries and also cause large financial loss.
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6.1 Summary of Research Findings
This dissertation starts by addressing the lack of empirical threat data for unsolicited IoT
devices due to various logistics and privacy concerns (noted in Chapter 2). Subsequently,
Chapter 3 proposes a unique methodology for correlating active and passive measurements to
identify the presence of malicious IoT data in network telescopes. This represents, to the best
of the author’s knowledge, a first-ever attempt to infer, characterize and attribute Internet-
scale notions of malicious IoT behavior using darknet data. IoT-related signatures are also
generated by using a unique hashing algorithm known as CPTH. Namely, this algorithm
outputs a percentage of similarity between two files rather than a binary output generated
by traditional hashes. These generated hashes (for malicious IoT devices) can then be used
by IDS/IPS setups to further strengthen network defenses. Overall, the key observations
from this chapter are summarized below:
• There are a large number of unsolicited IoT devices in the wild, and network telescopes
or darknets provide a good empirical source to generate notions of maliciousness for
such devices.
• DVRs and webcams are the most targeted IoT devices, comprising of more than 60%
of the total discovered malicious devices. Meanwhile SCADA systems also represent a
sizable fraction of compromised devices, i.e., totaling 28.4%. This observation is also
validated by the fact that DVRs and webcams were the most common devices used in
some recent DDoS attacks, as noted in Chapter 3.
• Generated signatures for each type of IoT device can be used to build effective security
mechanisms that can quickly identify the presence of malicious IoT data in network
traffic.
Chapter 4 extends the above work to classify the malicious activities of IoT devices
observed in the darknet data by using ML techniques. This objective is accomplished by
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proposing a novel taxonomy and labelling scheme that categorizes IoT activity as either
scanning, backscatter, or misconfiguration. A number of ML algorithms, such as Random
Forest, Gradient Boosting, Ada Boost and Naive Bayes are then trained to learn accurate
representations of darknet IoT activity. Extensive testing is then conducted using data from
different time periods to validate the efficacy of the proposed solutions. Overall, the results
of the experiments indicate the following:
• Gradient Boosting yields the highest precision and recall scores, i.e., it can effectively
identify whether a given device is infected (scanning), a victim of a DDoS attack
(backscatter) or improperly configured. This observation is also validated by the highly
successful applications of Gradient Boosting to other domains as well.
• Random Forest closely tracks the performance of Gradient Boosting in terms of ac-
curacy metrics. However, the parallelizable nature of operations in Random Forest is
very useful in situations which demand faster inference times.
• Ada Boost and Naive Bayes methods do not perform as well as the above two algo-
rithms, with Naive Bayes being the worst at identifying malicious IoT activity.
Overall, the proposed schemes can help cybersecurity operators identify different types
of malicious IoT activity directed toward or originating from IoT devices and adapt their
defense mechanisms accordingly. For example, if a device is identified as performing scanning,
it needs to be isolated from the rest of the network until the infection has been removed.
Similarly, if a device is identified as sending backscatter packets, it is likely a victim of a DoS
or DDoS attack and appropriate protection mechanisms can be implemented to mitigate the
attack.
Finally, Chapter 5 presents a GAN-based framework which is further tested on real IoT
traffic to identify known and zero-day threats. The main advantage of the approach is that
it is trained by analyzing only benign IoT samples, i.e., no malicious data is required during
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the training process. In particular, two different architectures tested here, i.e., ALI GAN
and AnoGAN. These solutions vary in the design of the generator network and also how
they perform inference. In addition to this, both cross-entropy and feature matching loss
methodologies are also tested by using a variety of datasets. Overall the findings indicate:
• The ALI GAN architecture (with a feature matching methodology) performs the best
on all 3 different datasets tested. These results clearly demonstrate the benefits of
learning both the latent and the sample distributions to improve the inference power
of the network.
• The feature matching methodology only gives a small improvement in overall accuracy
metrics when trying to identify malicious IoT activity. In fact, in the case of the
darknet dataset the performance using cross-entropy loss and feature matching loss is
almost the same.
• The inference time of the ALI GAN architecture is significantly better than the AnoGAN
framework and even beats the performance of ensemble frameworks (such as Gradient
Boosting and Random Forest) when tested on the same sample size.
In conclusion, this dissertation proposes and analyzes multiple methodologies that lever-
age network telescopes and ML algorithms to identify threats in an IoT network. Most
notably, network telescopes are used to characterize malicious IoT activity by correlating
with active measurements to detect the presence of millions of IoT devices. This finding
proves that network telescopes can offer hitherto unseen insights into large scale unsolicited
IoT activity. These empirical observations are also used to train ML algorithms that can fur-
ther identify whether or not a particular device is the victim or the perpetrator of an attack.
Finally, Chapter 5 demonstrates how GAN-based frameworks can be used as anomaly iden-
tifiers without the need for malicious data samples. The proposed methodology is especially
useful in the light of rising instances of zero-day threats.
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6.2 Future Work
To the best of the author’s knowledge, this work presents one of the first studies on
leveraging network telescope data for building IoT security solutions. The proposed schemes
also represent a solid foundation from which future research efforts in empirical IoT security
can be planned and pursued. Namely, the feature selection methodology of the algorithms
can be improved upon to capture the most relevant details for training algorithms. Research
work can also be done in the area of GAN-based frameworks to capture benign notions across
multiple layers of the communication model. Namely, instead of simply focusing on network
statistics, one can also train GANs on a range of other data, e.g., such as application layer
data, system data, etc. Future research efforts can also focus on training networks based
on cross-layer features, i.e., multiple features are extracted from the different layer of the
communication model to enable more accurate predictions. Finally, GAN networks trained
on both benign and anomalous sample can be used collectively to identify anomalies. This
framework is called co-operative GANs, in which the outputs of the two GAN networks can
either be averaged in an ensemble-like framework or be combined by a bi-linear pooling
operation to enable improved anomaly detection accuracy.
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Appendix B Glossary
ANN Artificial Neural Network
AP Access Point
ARP Address Resolution Protocol
BACnet Building Automation and Control networks
CAIDA Centre for Applied Internet Data Analysis
C&C Command and control
CoAP Constrained Application Protocol
CPU Central Processing Unit
CRC Cyclic Redundancy Check
CSV Comma Separated Value
DDoS Distributed Denial of Service
DL Deep Learning
DNS Domain Name Service
DoS Denial of Service
DVR Digital Video Recorder
FAR False Accuracy Rate
FNV Fowler-Noll-Vo
GAN Generative Adversarial Network
GPU Graphics Processing Unit
HTTP Hyper Text Transfer Protocol
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
IAAS Infrastructure-as-a-Service
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IBR Internet Background Radiation
ICMP Internet Control Message Protocol
IDS Intrusion Detection System
IoT Internet of Things
IPS Intrusion Prevention System
IRC Internet Relay Chat
ISP Internet Service Provider
kNN k Nearest Neighbor
LSTM Long Short Term Memory
MAC Media Access Control
ML Machine Learning
MITM Man-in-the-middle
MQTT Message Queuing Telemetry Transport
NE Nash Equilibrium
NFV Network Function Virtualization
NAT Network Address Translation
NFV Network Function Virtualization
REST Representational State Transfer
RFID Radio Frequency Identification
RNN Recurrent Neural Network
RPL Routing Protocol for Lossy networks
SAAS Software-as-a-Service
SCADA Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
SDN Software Defined Network
SINR Signal-to-interference-plus-noise-ratio
SVM Support Vector Machine
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TCP Transmission Control Protocol
UDP User Datagram Protocol
UPnP Universal Plug and Play
WSN Wireless Sensor Network
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